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 This thesis contributes to contemporary research in international corporate 
governance by investigating two related questions: (1) Is there a convergence in 
corporate governance towards the US model as suggested by theories of functional 
convergence and  (2) How do differing regulatory environments influence the choice 
of corporate governance instruments? 
In Part I, I examine if firms from poor investor protection regimes bond 
themselves to better corporate governance by listing on exchanges in more protective 
regimes, such as the US, thereby achieving functional convergence. I study the effect of 
cross-listing on ownership and control structures in a sample of 425 firms from 42 
countries that cross-list on a major exchange in the US. I find the following features post 
cross-listing: (1) Very few firms (11 out of 262) migrate to a dispersed ownership 
structure, contrary to the theory that firms change their corporate governance structure 
by bonding to US laws (2) A significant fraction of firms experience control changes 
where the original controlling shareholder sells his control block to a new owner (3) 
45% of the control changes result in a foreign owner and individual firm characteristics 
like small size and low leverage are strong predictors of a foreign control change (4) 
Firms that undergo a control change significantly increase their debt capacity. The 
findings of this section show that foreign firms use cross-listing as a means to sell 
control blocks and increase debt capacity rather than as legal bonding mechanisms. 
In Part II, I provide a theoretical motivation for the empirical finding in Part I, 
by deriving the features of an optimal governance system as a function of the level of 
investor protection in the economy. The model predicts that in an environment of 
poor investor protection, ownership, leverage and monitoring are complementary 
instruments of corporate governance where the use of one instrument increases the 
marginal benefit of the other. The model suggests that one cannot expect to see 
convergence in governance systems by changing only one aspect of the 
complementary cluster. Empirical evidence of the complementarities suggested by the 
model is provided using a sample of transition economy firms from the Amadeus 
Database.  
The two parts of the thesis together show that selection of corporate governance 
mechanisms involves complementarities between the mechanisms and the regulatory 
environment and we are not likely to see a convergence in governance structures unless 
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The subject of investor protection and corporate governance has been at the 
forefront of debate in both the corporate sector and in academic research. In a recent 
letter to the US trade representative, CEOs of several big companies voiced the need 
for strong investor protection rights with the following statement:  
“...investment abroad is still a risky business. We often face underdeveloped legal 
systems and judicial systems that are not independent or impartial. To spur the 
necessary investment, standards of investor protection, like those afforded all 
investors in the United States under U.S. law, are essential...”1 
Recent academic papers have also established the importance of better legal 
protection of minority investors for corporate governance. In a series of papers, La 
Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth LLSV) and several other 
authors studied the link between legal origin, investor protection and finance from a 
comparative empirical perspective raising a range of important questions. One of the 
important contributions of this literature towards understanding  corporate 
governance structures in different countries was the cross-country variation reported 
in ownership concentration and financing arrangements by LLSV. Their main 
argument, as described in Shleifer and Vishny (1997) is that when the legal 
                                                 
1 CEO Letter on Importance of Maintaining High Standards of Investment Protection, Signed by Chairman and 
Chief Executive Officer of New York Life International, UPS, Eastman Chemical Company, American 
International Group, E.I. du Pont de Nemours and Company, CBS Corporation, National Foreign Trade Council, 
The McGraw-Hill Companies, Cargill Incorporated, Wainwright Industries and The Chubb Corporation; 
Chairman of Pacific Basin Economic Council-U.S. Committee, Emergency Committee for American Trade, 
United States Council for International Business, Procter & Gamble ; President, Automotive Trade Policy 
Council; Chairman of the Board of Directors National Association of Manufacturers; United States Council for 







framework does not offer sufficient protection for outside investors, entrepreneurs 
and original owners are forced to maintain large positions themselves. 
The above body of literature gave rise to the second generation of corporate 
governance literature where the main focus is to investigate if there is one system of 
corporate governance that can be advocated to all countries. Studies like Coffee 
(2000) argue that the globalization of financial and commodity markets and an open 
exchange of ideas and information would be the driving forces of convergence of 
basic systems of corporate governance. Convergence theorists also argue that the 
convergence in corporate governance will occur not at the level of corporate laws, but 
at the level of securities regulation. So international migration of companies to US 
markets should bring about a convergence in function to one system of corporate 
governance, the US model . 
This thesis conducts an empirical investigation of convergence by examining 
the change in ownership concentration of firms that cross-list on US markets. This is 
one of the first studies to look at time-series changes in corporate governance 
structures to test the convergence theories. Chapter 1 of the thesis contains a detailed 
analysis of ownership changes in foreign firms that issue American depositary 
receipts (ADRs). The main results of Chapter 1 show that there is very little evidence 
of convergence-related movement to a dispersed ownership structure on cross-listing. 
Further, the study advances a new hypothesis for the motivation of firms to cross-list. 
Many of the foreign firms seem to use the ADR as a vehicle to sell the company to a 
new controlling owner. Intuitively, this result is similar to Zingales (1995) where he 







Foreign firms seem to be doing something similar by cross-listing on US markets. 
The second chapter of this thesis is devoted to developing a theoretical 
rationale for the empirical investigation in Chapter 1 and to investigate if one form of 
governance should really fit all. In this chapter, I design an optimal corporate 
governance system  that is a function of the prevailing regulatory environment. The 
chapter shows that there are significant complementarities between different parts of 
a governance system and the legal and institutional environment, which help 
overcome the agency costs specific to that economy. The complementarities suggest 
that corporate governance instruments are adopted in clusters and different clusters 
are optimal in different regulatory environments. This has two significant 
implications: First, we are unlikely to observe changes in ownership concentration of 
foreign firms when the body of laws and enforcement that applies to these firms is 
very different from that which applies to US firms. Second, the existence of 
complementarities has strong implications for policy reform in transition economies. 
Reforms must recognize the complementarities between different aspects of a 
governance system to be fully effective.  
The rest of this thesis is organized as follows. Each chapter presents a detailed 
introduction of the issues at hand, followed by a rigorous empirical/theoretical 
analysis. The implications of the analyses for corporate governance reform are 











Chapter 1. Does Cross-Listing lead to Functional 




CEOs of foreign companies often cite the desire for increased corporate 
governance as one of the motivations for cross-listing on US exchanges.2 This is 
supported by the Functional Convergence Hypothesis developed most broadly by 
Coffee (1999, 2002), which states that foreign firms incorporated in a jurisdiction 
with weak investor protection rights cross-list on US securities markets to “legally 
bond” themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter enforcement. This helps 
them attract investors who would otherwise be reluctant to invest or those who would 
discount such stocks because of the risk of fraud and embezzlement. However, the 
empirical evidence on the bonding hypothesis remains mixed. While studies by Reese 
and Weisbach (2002) and Mitton (2002) provide empirical support for the importance 
of legal bonding, a more recent study by Seigel (2002) finds that US securities laws 
were quite ineffective in deterring or punishing insider stealing in a sample of 
Mexican firms.3  
                                                 
2 Following is the statement by Mr. H. N. Sinor, the Managing Director & CEO of ICICI Bank, one of India’s 
largest banks and the first bank from Asia (excluding Japan) to list on the NYSE : “…we wanted to be much more 
transparent in our disclosures. We adopted US GAAP and the norms specified by the Securities and Exchange 
Commission (SEC) of the US are much stricter than the norms specified by the Indian regulators - RBI and SEBI. 
After the ADR issue, we have a class of investors who are more demanding as far as corporate governance and 
disclosures go. We wanted that we should be constantly evaluated by foreign investors and benchmarked against 
global companies.” http://www.indiainfoline.com/comp/icba/2004.html 
3 Earlier studies such as Fanto (1996) even suggest that SEC requirements for foreign firms are meaningless. Most 
other authors including MacNeil (2001), Cheung and Lee (1995) and Licht (2001) stress the need for additional 







In this paper, I provide an alternative approach to test the bonding hypothesis 
by looking at the effect of legal bonding on ownership and control structures. The 
seminal work in the area of law and finance by La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer, 
and Vishny (henceforth LLSV) (1998) has established that the extent of legal 
protection provided to minority shareholders in a jurisdiction determines if the firms 
incorporated in that country have a concentrated or a dispersed ownership structure. 
A cross-listing by a foreign firm on a US securities market provides a unique 
opportunity to test what happens to ownership structure when a firm migrates from a 
poor investor protection environment to one with greater protection for minority 
investors and better enforcement (the US market). 
Recent literature suggests that there are several views on what could happen to 
ownership structure on cross-listing. One view, supported by theories of functional 
convergence (Coffee 1999) and by the rent-protection theory of ownership (Bebchuk 
1999), predicts that migrating to a corporate law system that effectively limits private 
benefits of control can produce more efficient choices of ownership structure.  
For instance, Coffee (2001) argues that dispersed ownership could arise and 
persist if there is significant improvement in protection of minority rights in European 
and transitional economies. Therefore, if cross-listing on the US market accords at 
least some of this improvement in investor protection for firms listing from these 
countries, a change in their ownership structures would be expected. John and Kedia 
(2000) in fact, make the prediction that firms from weak legal regimes should 
experience rapid changes in corporate governance on cross-listing.  







Bebchuk and Roe (1999), which states that the ownership structure of a firm at any 
point is influenced by the initial ownership pattern due to complementarities, network 
externalities, and sunk costs.  If a firm starts out with a concentrated ownership 
structure, the controlling owner is likely to retain control or sell the control block to a 
new incoming shareholder, rather than sell voting rights to a dispersed group of 
shareholders. Therefore, the theory predicts that the initial ownership patterns of 
foreign firms persist after cross-listing. 
This paper tests the two theories by using a unique database of 425 firms from 
42 countries that cross-listed on a major exchange in the United States. I examine 
time-series changes in ownership and control structures around the date of cross-
listing. The aggregate picture shows that a majority of the firms that cross-list have an 
initial controlling shareholder (73%) and family ownership is the most dominant form 
of control–roughly one in two firms has a family as the controlling owner. There also 
exists a high degree of separation of ownership and control rights in these firms 
through the use of pyramidal structures and other control-enhancing features. And as 
expected from La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, and Shleifer (1999), most of the cross-
listing firms that are widely held, to start with, are from English common law 
countries.  
When I examine the change in ownership structure over time, I find that there 
is a small decline in the percentage of voting rights held by the controlling 
shareholder in cross-listing firms as compared to a benchmark sample of firms that do 
not cross-list. This decline is largest for firms from countries with poor investor 







owners as a state or another corporation. Interestingly, I find that the decline 
decreases with time. The mean voting rights held by the controlling shareholders 
decrease in the year of cross-listing and for three years thereafter. However, the 
controlling shareholders start reconsolidating their position in the fourth and fifth 
years after cross-listing.   
The decline in voting rights around the time of cross-listing is not large 
enough to result in a widely-held ownership structure, suggesting little evidence of 
any convergence-related movement. The result holds true even for sub-samples of 
firms that had an initial public offering via the ADR and for state owned enterprises 
that privatized using ADR issues. This persistence in concentrated ownership 
patterns, even after listing on US markets, lends support to the path-dependence 
theory of ownership structures.  
 Although most of the companies continue to be controlled by an ultimate 
owner on cross-listing, I document a high incidence of changes in the identity of the 
controlling shareholder. Controlling shareholders in 35% of the sample of cross-
listing firms approach US markets as a way to divest their stake and sell their control 
block. Several reasons contribute to why a US listing might facilitate such a sale, 
including greater visibility (Baker, Nofsinger, and Weaver (2002)), superior earnings 
forecasts (Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003), and higher valuations (Doidge, Karolyi, and 
Stulz (2003)). I elaborate on the reasons in the next section of the paper.  Many of the 
exiting controlling shareholders happen to be either the state or a family and the new 
entrants are predominantly widely held corporations. Further, I find that more than 







I then turn to firm and country-level data to get a better understanding of 
which characteristics influence a change of control in companies on cross-listing. I 
use the Worldscope database as a source of firm-level data for the cross-listing firms. 
I find that country-level characteristics like size and liquidity of the home country’s 
market and the extent of legal rules and investor protection are significant predictors 
of a control change to domestic owners. In contrast, individual firm characteristics, 
such as size, leverage and market valuation are important predictors of control change 
to foreign owners.  Additional tests show that capital control regulations and FDI 
restrictions in the home country decrease the probability of control changes to foreign 
shareholders.   
Post-listing characteristics of firms that cross-list show that all firms have 
significantly higher foreign income growth rates. So an ADR listing is able to expand 
the international orientation of the foreign firms. I also find that firms that undergo 
control changes, especially to foreign owners significantly increase their leverage 
ratios.  
In summary, the paper shows that the increased regulation associated with US 
markets is not effective enough in changing the ownership concentration of foreign 
firms that cross-list on US exchanges. The feature of the US corporate law system 
that limits private benefits of control doesn’t produce an increase in dispersed 
ownership structures in firms issuing an ADR. However, cross-listing does provide an 
opportunity for existing shareholders to sell out to new owners as evidenced by the 
high incidence of control transfers in the study sample. The results suggest that there 







On the other hand, there is evidence to show that certain firms use the ADR as a first 
step in the final sale of the company. 
This chapter is organized as follows. Section 1.2 examines related literature 
and discusses the main hypothesis this paper tests. Section 1.3 discusses the data and 
summary statistics. Section 1.4 presents the main results. Section 1.5 concludes with 
implications for future research.  
 
1.2. Motivation and Related Literature 
In this section I identify the different ways in which foreign companies can 
approach the US markets and the reasons for them to do so. Section 1.2.1 discusses 
what an American Depositary Receipt (ADR) is and the Securities Exchange 
Commission (SEC) rules and regulations that a company issuing an ADR is subject 
to. Section 1.2.2 discusses the various reasons why a company may cross-list on a US 
exchange including implications of the bonding hypothesis. Section 1.2.3 lays out the 
main hypothesis I test in this paper regarding ownership changes around cross-listing.  
 
1.2.1.What are ADRs? 
Firms can migrate to US securities markets either by listing foreign shares 
through an American Depository Receipt (ADR) on the NYSE, NASDAQ or AMEX 
or by listing shares directly on these exchanges. An ADR is a negotiable instrument 
issued by a US commercial bank acting as a depositary and represents a fraction or a 







deposit with the depositary’s correspondent bank (the custodian bank) located in the 
home country of the issuer. Firms seeking the benefits of ADRs can choose from four 
different types of sponsored ADR programs, each with its own set of benefits as well 
as its own set of legal and regulatory requirements: Level I, Level II, Level III, and 
Rule 144A/GDR.  
A Level I depositary receipt program is the simplest method for companies to 
access the U.S. and non-U.S. capital markets. Level I depositary receipts are traded in 
the U.S. OTC market with prices published in the "Pink Sheets" and on some 
exchanges outside the United States. Establishment of a sponsored Level I program 
does not require full SEC registration and the companies do not have to report their 
accounts under U.S. GAAP or provide full SEC disclosure. A company cannot raise 
capital via a Level I ADR. 
Companies that wish to raise capital or make an acquisition using securities, 
use Sponsored Level II or Sponsored Level III depositary receipts. Level II and Level 
III depositary receipt programs require SEC registration and adherence to applicable 
requirements for U.S. GAAP. Reporting requirements include Form F-6 registration 
statement to register the ADR, Form 20-F registration statement that contains detailed 
financial information about the issuer, and Form F-1 to register the equity securities 
underlying the ADRs and annual reports. 
Foreign companies can also access the U.S. and other capital markets through 
Rule 144A and/or Regulation S Depositary Receipt facilities without SEC 
registration. Rule 144A programs provide for raising capital through the private 







Institutional Buyers or QIBs) in the United States. Regulation S programs provide for 
raising capital through the placement of Depositary Receipts offshore to non-U.S. 
investors in reliance on Regulation S. 
Since I am interested in studying the effect of US laws on ownership changes 
for cross-listing firms, I use only Level II and Level III ADRs for this study. 
 
1.2.2. Why do Firms Cross-List? The Bonding Hypothesis 
There exist several reasons why a company might want to list abroad: to 
expand investor base, to increase stock liquidity, to improve the terms on which they 
can raise capital, to increase visibility of the company, and to achieve non-financial 
benefits such as increasing customer base by broadening product recognition amongst 
investors of the host country. These and other motivations are reviewed in detail in 
Karolyi (1998) and Pagano, Roell and Zechner (2002).  
This section examines the investor protection and corporate governance 
argument applied to cross-listing. According to the Bonding Hypothesis, exchanges 
with strict regulation and disclosure requirements are the ones attracting foreign firms 
rather than exchanges with inadequate supervision. Below are some of the aspects of 
greater regulation that cross-listing on a US stock exchange via a Level II or Level III 
ADR entails: 
• Issuer is subject to SEC enforcement 
• Issuer is committed to providing full information and to reconciling financial 







• Issuer is subject to listing requirements imposed by the exchange it lists on 
• Issuer is exposed to the “scrutiny of reputational intermediaries including US 
underwriters, auditors, debt rating agencies and securities analysts” as 
suggested by Coffee (2002). Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003) show that the 
earnings forecasts of cross-listing firms are superior to those that do not cross-
list. 
Cantale (1996) and Fuerst (1998) show that firms signal quality by listing on 
strictly regulated markets. They predict that companies that cross-list on a more 
demanding exchange should exhibit higher profitability than those that list on 
exchanges with not so severe regulatory standards. Stulz (1999) predicts that 
companies from countries with poor legal standards can reduce the agency costs of 
external finance by subjecting themselves to tighter standards. 
However, empirical testing of these models has yielded mixed results. Reese 
and Weisbach (2002) find that once they control for firm size, firms from weak 
investor protection countries are less likely to list in the US. However, firms from 
these countries that do cross-list issue more equity on cross-listing. Another paper 
that provides a direct test of this hypothesis is by Doidge et. al. (2003), who find that 
corporate governance seems to be secondary compared to other factors that drive 
large firms to tap US markets. Seigel (2002) finds that US securities laws are 
ineffective in punishing expropriation and insider stealing especially if the foreign 
firm has no assets in the US. So it all comes down to the extraterritorial reach of US 
securities laws.  







interplay of the issuer’s home country corporate laws and the US federal securities 
law. Shareholder rights being the purview of corporate law, the corporate law of the 
foreign issuer’s home country determines the rights and protections for shareholders 
of the foreign issuer. However, certain corporate governance issues are regulated by 
US federal securities laws and the rules of the national securities exchanges on which 
the companies are listed. This is the basis on which the bonding hypothesis presumes 
that US securities law deters corporate malfeasance by foreign issuers. Further, the 
recently instituted Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002, which is aimed at higher corporate 
accountability to shareholders, extends to all public corporations, including ADR 
issuers, which have their securities, listed on US exchanges.  
However, several factors undermine the importance of US securities law with 
respect to ADR holders. I discuss some of these below: 
• The laws of many countries recognize the depositary bank as the shareholder 
of the securities underlying the ADR program and not the ADR holders. To be 
recognized as the shareholder of the underlying securities, many countries 
require the ADR holders to remove their ADR shares from the program and 
receive the underlying shares, thereby becoming a registered shareholder of 
the foreign issuer. 
• No NYSE rules regarding notice of shareholder meetings or disclosure of 
meeting agenda items to holders of ADRs 
• Foreign issuers are not subject to the SEC’s proxy rules 







including quorum requirements for these meetings 
• Depository agreements: In addition to federal securities law, the depository 
agreements play an important role in determining voting rights of ADR 
holders. Under some agreements, the issuer agrees to recognize the holders of 
ADRS as shareholders of the underlying securities and not the depository 
bank. There is no difference made between holders of ADRs and domestic 
investors in the foreign country. However some depository agreements 
severely limit voting rights of the ADR holders. These include prohibiting 
ADR holders’ voting rights other than in limited circumstances; some 
agreements provide that if ADR holders do not vote, shares are autoproxied to 
the issuer; many include a disclaimer that there is no guarantee that ADR 
holders will receive proxy materials in time too exercise their votes and in 
some agreements, a depository bank that is recognized as the shareholder may 
not split its vote if ADR holders provide conflicting voting. 
There also exist several provisions in current SEC regulations to allow for 
accommodations to foreign issuers. For instance, one of the requirements of Sarbanes 
Oxley is that listed companies have audit committees consisting of external, 
independent directors. Some foreign issuers are exempt from this requirement and 
allowed to have internal auditors, especially when it is authorized by the issuer’s 
home-country statutes. Foreign issuers are also exempt from Regulation Fair 
Disclosure (Regulation FD) which prohibits the practice of selective disclosure of 








In sum, the non-uniformity in regulations that apply to domestic and foreign 
issuers emphasizes the need for empirical work at the firm level to establish whether 
legal bonding influences the corporate governance structure of the foreign firms that 
cross-list on US exchanges. The following section discusses the thought experiment 
behind this paper. 
 
1.2.3. Legal Bonding and Ownership Structure 
This paper tests the effectiveness of increased corporate governance 
associated with US legal rules on cross-listing firms. LLS (1999) have shown that the 
level of investor protection in a country is an important determinant of ownership 
structure of firms. Proponents of the rent-protection theory of ownership like 
Bebchuk (1999) argue that countries with poor investor protection like French civil 
law countries have concentrated ownership structures because of the high value of 
private benefits of control in these countries. In contrast, countries following English 
common law have more dispersed shareholder structure because the legal rules and 
enforcement mechanism in these countries limit the existence of control benefits for a 
large shareholder.  
If the bonding hypothesis were to hold, controlling shareholders of cross-
listing firms would no longer be able to consume private benefits when subject to 
stricter US securities laws. John and Kedia (2002) in discussing ownership as one of 
the instruments of corporate governance predict that firms migrating to exchanges 
with stricter regulation should see a “rapid change in their existing governance 







structure when there is a reform in the extent of minority shareholder rights protection 
because of investors’ preferences for ownership and liquidity.  
The above legal hypothesis of ownership structure is supported by corporate 
governance convergence theories. According to Coffee (1999) and Gilson (2001), 
convergence in corporate norms does not always require a formal legislative 
amendment of corporate laws and codes in different countries. Firms listing on 
foreign stock exchanges opt into foreign governance standards, thus developing a 
functional substitute to formal convergence. Therefore cross-listing firms practice 
legal bonding as a form of functional convergence4. 
Related to this is the path dependence view of ownership structure, which says 
that there are significant sources of path dependence in patterns of corporate 
ownership structure. Initial ownership structures have an effect on subsequent 
structures because of sunk adaptive costs, network externalities and 
complementarities. Further, if the initial pattern of ownership structure provides one 
group of players with relatively more wealth and power, this group would have a 
better chance to influence the corporate rules, which in turn would reinforce the initial 
patterns of ownership. So the question comes down to whether the regulations 
provided by US securities laws for cross-listing firms are strong enough to override 
the home country’s lax regulatory system.  
There seem to be other advantages associated with making the transition from a 
concentrated ownership structure to a dispersed form. For example, Himmelberg, 
                                                 
4 Legal theorists distinguish between “formal convergence” and “functional convergence”. Formal convergence in 
corporate governance requires a legislative amendment of corporate codes and Coffee (1999) argues that 
legislative inertia and role of special interest groups actually hinder formal convergence. Functional convergence, 
on the other hand, doesn’t require formal institutional change and is brought upon by globalization forces which 







Hubbard and Love (2002) find that ownership concentration increases the cost of 
capital and leads to inefficiencies in investment. A dispersed ownership structure 
supported by US laws would help overcome the associated under-investment problem 
for cross-listing companies.  
Cross-listing on a US exchange may also affect ownership structure by 
facilitating a control transfer. Controlling shareholders who wish to sell their stakes 
might view issuing an ADR as a way to increase the price at which they can sell their 
stakes. Several factors could contribute to this: Recent work by Baker, Nofsinger and 
Weaver (2002) shows that a US cross-listing increases the firm’s visibility in the 
media and among analysts. Lang, Lins and Miller (2003) show that the earnings 
forecasts of cross-listing firms are superior to those that do not cross-list. This 
increase in information associated with cross-listing is helpful in making the company 
attractive to more potential buyers. Further, Diodge et al (2003) have shown that there 
is a valuation differential associated with cross-listing firms. Finally, just listing on a 
US exchange could be a signal of quality and adherence to corporate governance for 
the cross-listing firm. All these reasons contribute to possible changes in ownership 
and control structure after cross-listing. 
This paper is also related to existing literature on ownership changes 
surrounding the IPO process. Many cross-listing firms are also first-time issuers in 
that they IPO on US exchanges. Papers like Booth and Chua (1996), Brennan and 
Franks (1997) and Field and Sheehan (2000) suggest that firms disperse their shares 
rapidly after a US-IPO and use underpricing as a tool to generate excess demand and 







find that firms elect to remain private if they are motivated by preservation of 
decision-making control and ownership. On the other hand, Zingales (1995) and 
Mello and Parsons (1998) argue that the IPO is only the first stage in eventual sale of 
control blocks, which could occur many years after the IPO. Literature on ownership 
changes associated with IPOs in other countries is very limited. Rydqvist and 
Hogholm (1995) investigate the going public decision in a sample of family-owned 
corporations in Sweden and find that the original owners liquidate their stakes in a 
majority of the cases. In a more recent study employing a larger sample of Swedish 
companies, Holmen and Hogfeldt (2003) find that ownership remains controlled 
subsequent to an IPO offering. While several other studies examine the identity of 
ownership structures in different countries (including LLS 1999, Claessens et. al. 
(2000)), this paper is one of the first to study time series changes in ownership 
structure. 
 
1.3. Sample Construction and Descriptive Statistics 
To study the relationship between cross-listing, corporate governance and 
ownership structure, I create a sample of foreign firms that listed on a major US stock 
exchange since the year 1990. The complete list of cross-listing firms is obtained 
from the Bank of New York’s ADR Index. The cross-listing year and type of issue 
details are also verified using Citibank’s ADR Universe. In the event of a discrepancy 
between the Bank of New York’s ADR Index and Citibank’s ADR Universe, I use 







the NYSE and the NASDAQ. 
To be included in the final sample, the following criteria are imposed: (1) 
Since I am interested in testing the effect of US legal rules, I include only Level 2 
ADRs and Level 3 ADRs in the sample. Firms that list via Level 1 ADRs (OTC 
stocks) or Rule 144a are subject to little or no SEC disclosure requirements and do 
not have to comply with US GAAP and so are excluded from the sample. (2) I use 
only those cross-listing firms that are covered by Worldscope database. Since most of 
the firms that cross-list are big companies with high market capitalization, there is 
little danger of losing out a large sample of the cross-listing firms by using 
Worldscope. Further, I have access to firm-level data in Worldscope only from the 
year 1990. So the year 1990 is the initial cut-off date for the sample. (3) Finally, I 
include only firms for which I can get ownership information from one year prior to 
cross-listing to one-year after cross-listing. So there is at least three years of 
ownership information for each cross-listing firm. The final sample extends from 
1990 to 2002 and contains 425 firms that cross-listed on a major US stock exchange.  
 
1.3.1. Cross-listing by Year, Exchange and Country 
Panel A of Table 1.1 shows the distribution of the sample by year of listing 
and exchange. More number of firms list on the NYSE, which has the strictest 
disclosure requirements than on the NASDAQ. Very few firms list on AMEX stock 
exchange.   
Panel B of Table 1.1 presents data on cross-listing by country of origin. 







tradition into English Common Law, French civil law, German civil law, 
Scandinavian civil law and Socialist Law countries. I exclude cross-listing firms from 
China since it does not belong to any of the legal traditions identified above. I also 
exclude cross-listing firms from Canada since none of them issue ADRs and all are 
direct cross-listings. The sample confirms the findings of Reese and Weisbach (2002) 
that more firms list from French civil law countries than from English common law 
countries and they do so disproportionately on the NYSE than on the NASDAQ. 
While 81% of firms from French civil law countries list on the NYSE, only 53% from 
the English common law countries do so.  
 
1.3.2. Ownership Characteristics—Prior to Cross-listing 
For each of the companies in the sample, I identify who the ultimate owner of 
the company is, what his cash flow to voting rights are and whether there has been a 
change in ultimate owner from two years prior to issuing an ADR to five years, post-
listing.  
As a starting point for the data collection, I use Worldscope, which provides 
annual data on the names and holdings of all owners that hold more than 5% of a 
company’s stock. This information is supplemented with data from a variety of 
sources to include all owners who have more than 5% of outstanding stock and are 
missing in Worldscope. All the sources used are listed country-wise in Appendix 1.B. 
For the years prior to ADR listing, the main sources of data are Worldscope 
and company annual reports filed either with the domestic stock exchange or 







company handbooks like the Brazil Company Handbook and Venezuelan Company 
Handbook and international databases such as Mergent International.  
The ownership information for the years after ADR listing is more easily 
available because a large fraction of the ADRs file Form 20-F with the SEC. Section 
7 of this form titled Major Shareholders and Related Party Transactions (prior to 
1999, it was Section 4 titled Control of Registrant) requires the ADR issuer to list all 
persons known to the company to own directly or indirectly more than 5% of the 
issued classes of stock. Further, the company is required to mention if there have been 
any significant changes in ownership structure in the past three years. Consequently, 
many companies provide detailed time-series information on major shareholdings in 
their 20-F statements. The source for the 20-F filings was both Lexis-Nexis and 
Hoovers Online. In all cases, the ownership information is collected for the end of the 
fiscal year or the closest possible date. This is because ownership information 
typically lags by about six months in the 20-F filings and by one or two years in the 
Company Handbooks and Worldscope. 
I include companies for which it is possible to determine that all the major 
shareholders are listed or if it is possible to identify the shareholder who owns 50% or 
more of the cash flow rights. For cases in which the shareholder owns less than 50% 
and the rest is held by nominee accounts, I use the 20-F statements to decide whether 
or not to include the company in the sample5.  
The ADR firms are divided into firms that are widely held and those with 
controlling ultimate owners. The procedure for identifying the ultimate owners is 
                                                 
5 This is different from Claessens et al (2000) who actually drop such companies. My justification for 
including it is that I use 20-F statements to verify whether the nominee accounts are widely held or in 







similar to the one in LLS (1999) and Claessens et. al. (2000). I use two cut-off levels, 
20% and 10% to identify ultimate owners. An ultimate owner is therefore defined as 
someone who has 20% (or 10%) or more of the control votes of the company and is 
not controlled by anyone else. This sometimes involves tracking down ownership 
along multiple chains to find the major shareholders in the major shareholders and so 
on till we arrive at an ultimate owner who is not controlled by anyone else. The 
identity of the ultimate owners is further classified into five types: widely held 
corporation, widely held financial institution, families (or individuals with large 
stake), state (or government or kingdom) and miscellaneous. The miscellaneous 
category typically includes cooperatives, voting trusts (as is common in Netherlands) 
or a business group with no single controlling investor. If a firm does not have an 
ultimate owner, it is classified as widely held. If a firm has multiple ultimate owners, 
I pick the largest ultimate owner for the analysis.  
Panel A of Table 1.2 presents ownership statistics at the 20% cut-off level and 
Panel B presents statistics at the 10% cut-off level. The firms are classified by the 
legal system they belong to and by the identity of the controlling shareholder. The 
two panels show similar trends at the two cut-off levels. The largest fraction of cross-
listing firms that are widely held are from English common law countries (61% and 
49% at the 20% level and 10% levels respectively). This is to be expected since LLS 
(1999) have shown that dispersed ownership is a characteristic of only English 
common law countries.  
Further, family ownership seems to be the most predominant form of control 







at the 10% cut-off level, 310 firms have a controlling owner of which 151 firms are 
controlled by a family. The smallest group of ultimate owners is widely held 
corporations (21 out of 310). The state controlled firms are typically ones that used 
American Depositary Receipts as a privatization vehicle.  
 
1.3.3. Degree of Separation of Ownership and Control—Prior to cross-listing 
  For each firm in the sample, I make the distinction between ownership (cash 
flow rights) and control (voting rights) using the procedures in Claessens et al (2000) 
and LLSV (1999).  As an example, consider the simplest case in which Firm A owns 
25% of Firm B which in turn owns 60% of Firm C. Assuming that A is a widely held 
corporation, C is classified as being controlled by a widely held corporation, which is 
A, who owns 15% of the cash flow rights (product of the ownership stakes along the 
chain) and 25% of the voting rights (weakest control chain) of C. In many cases, the 
ultimate owner (here A) could have several control right chains through which he 
controls C. Then the ultimate control share is given by the sum of the weakest control 
shares along each chain. For instance if A also held 50% of Firm D which held 35% 
of C, then ultimate control share of A via B and D would be = 25+35 =60% while the 
total cash flow rights of A would be = 0.25*60+0.50*35 = 32.5%. 
 Panel A of Table 1.3 presents the cash flow and voting rights of the 
controlling shareholders for the full sample and also on the basis of the identity of 
controlling shareholder and legal tradition. The data are presented for the year of 
cross-listing. Full sample characteristics show that the percentage of voting rights 







rights at the 1% level. This separation of ownership and control is further reflected for 
each type of controlling owner. The separation is maximum in the case of family 
controlled enterprises (-5.12 % at 1% significance) and least for firms controlled by a 
widely held corporation. (-1.48 %). The degree of separation is also seen by looking 
at the ratio of cash flow rights to voting rights (C/V). The mean C/V for the whole 
sample is 0.89, which implies that the mean controlling shareholder can control 100% 
of the voting rights using only 89% of the cash flow rights. The same statistics are 
reported for different legal traditions. Separation is least significant for firms listing 
from English common law countries (-1.8%) and maximum for firms from French 
civil law countries (-6.8%). There does not appear to be much separation of cash flow 
and voting rights in the firms listing from German and Scandinavian civil law 
countries or from Socialist law countries.  
The ratios are also significantly different from each other across different 
legal traditions as shown in Panel B of Table 1.3. Panel B of Table 1.3 also reports 
the mean ratio of cash flow to voting rights when countries are classified on the basis 
of Law and Enforcement, Financial Development and Transparency. To investigate if 
the degree of law and enforcement in the home country of the cross-listing firm 
affects the ratio of cash flow to voting rights, I use three alternate measures from 
LLSV (1998):  Shareholder Rights, Law and Order Score and Judicial Efficiency. 
The countries are classified into high and low depending on the median value of each 
of these measures.  
Shareholder Rights is a measure of shareholder rights protection in the 







which is formed by aggregating six important shareholder rights. Law and Order 
Score is a measure of the law and order tradition in the country ranging from 1 to 10 
from the International Country Risk Guide. Judicial Efficiency is another index 
scored 0 to 10 from the country-risk rating agency Business International Corporation 
that is an assessment of the efficiency of the legal environment from the investors’ 
perspective. 
 On all three measures, I find that firms need a larger portion of cash flow 
rights to control 100% of the firm in countries with good legal rules and enforcement. 
In comparison, the ratios are significantly lower for cross-listing firms from countries 
that are not protective of investors. 
 In addition to shareholder protection variables, I investigate if the ratio of cash 
flow to voting rights in cross-listing firms also varies with the level of financial 
development of their home country. Lins, Strickland and Zenner (2003) and Reese 
and Weisbach (2002) show that firms from emerging markets are more likely to 
cross-list. I use three different but comparable measures from the Financial Structure 
Database constructed by Beck et. al (2000) : Higher values of The Index of Financial 
Structure indicate a more market based financial system. Developed is a dummy that 
takes the value 1 if the firm’s home market is developed and 0 if it is an emerging 
market firm. Overall Size is a variable indicating the overall size of the financial 
system (both the stock market and the banking sector). See Appendix 1.A for a 
detailed description of the variables definition and their sources. 
 I find that ratio of cash flow to voting rights is significantly lower for 







systems. Firms from countries with more market based economies have higher cash 
flow to voting rights indicating that financial structure of the home market is a 
significant determinant of the extent of control benefits in firms.  
 Finally since all firms that cross-list via a Level II or Level III ADR have to 
conform to US GAAP, I investigate if the cash flow to voting rights ratio varies with 
home country’s accounting standards. I use an Accounting index produced by the 
Center for International Financial Analysis and Research Inc that is a measure of 
disclosure requirements and transparency in accounting statements produced by firms 
in different countries. Poorer the accounting standards, one would expect controlling 
shareholders to be better able to divert funds and expropriate requiring a lower 
amount of cash flow to voting rights. I find that the ratio is 0.86 for firms with poor 
accounting standards, which is significantly lower than the ratio of 0.95 for firms with 
good accounting standards. 
 
1.3.4. Use of Control Enhancing Features --Prior to cross-listing 
The ways in which cash flow rights can be different from control rights is 
through the use of dual classes of stock, pyramidal structures and cross shareholdings. 
I create dummies for each of these categories. Dual-Class equals one if the firm 
issues multiple classes of shares with different voting rights, Pyramid equals one if 
the controlling owner exercises control through at least one publicly traded company 
and Cross-Shareholding equals 1 if the company has a controlling shareholder and 
owns a percentage of shares in either its controlling shareholder or in any other 







controlling owner, Single, and if any person from higher management is also from the 
controlling family, Management. See Claessens et al (2000) for detailed description 
of these variables.  
Table 1.4 presents details on the prevalence of various control enhancing 
features in different cross-listing firms. As in Table 1.3, firms are classified on the 
basis of their home country’s legal rules, law and enforcement, financial development 
and accounting standards. The use of multiple classes of shares with different voting 
rights is significantly higher (lower) in firms from French civil law (English common 
law) countries than in firms cross-listing from other countries. The use of pyramidal 
structures seems to be quite high (around 50%) in most of the companies irrespective 
of the legal system they belong to. Cross-shareholding structures are more common in 
Scandinavian countries in this sample.  
When countries are classified on the basis of shareholder rights protection and 
legal enforcement, I find that pyramiding is very common in firms whose home 
countries are not very protective of minority shareholders (61%), have low law and 
order scores (57%) and rank low on the score of judicial efficiency (53%). Similar 
statistics hold for the use of multiple voting classes of shares. 37% of firms listing 
from countries with poor legal and judicial systems use multiple classes of shares as 
compared to only 10% of firms coming from protective legal and efficient judicial 
systems.  Therefore, I find that the use of control enhancing structures in firms that 
cross-list from different countries is very representative of the overall use of these 
structures in those economies as discussed in LLS (1999). 







large financial systems and market based economies are less likely to have multiple 
classes of voting shares and less likely to have a single controlling shareholder. This 
is as expected because a growing body of research has shown that a country’s set of 
legal rules and legal institutions is important for explaining the level of bank and 
stock market development (LLSV 1998). Hence one would expect ownership 
concentration levels and general ownership characteristics to vary with the level of 
financial development of the home market.  
In addition, the controlling shareholder belongs to upper management in most 
of the firms listing from under-developed economies. On the account of level of 
transparency in the accounting system of the country, I find that firms that cross-list 
from countries with poor accounting standards have significantly higher pyramidal 
structures, multiple classes of shares and single controlling shareholders.  
 
1.3.5. Econometric Issues 
A potential concern with any kind of analysis using cross-listed firms is the 
endogeneity of the cross-listing decision. Specifically, if a firm cross-lists, it chooses 
to do so and may differ significantly from firms that do not cross-list. In fact, as 
discussed in Table 1.8, a look at the pre-cross-listing characteristics of the cross-
listing firms shows that they are systematically different from firms that do not cross 
list. Hence it is important to determine whether any observed post-cross-listing 
changes in voting rights or performance is caused by cross-listing or if cross-listing is 
merely associated with these changes, via its correlation with firm characteristics.  







matching estimator that estimates the average treatment effect on the treated, where 
“treatment” corresponds to the cross-listing decision. Any simple matching estimator 
would match each treated unit (cross-listing firm) to one/more untreated units 
(domestic firms that did not cross-list) with similar values of pre-treatment variables. 
Then the average effect of the treatment on the treated units is estimated by averaging 
within match differences between the treated and the untreated units. The main 
assumption behind constructing most matching estimators is that assignment to 
treatment is unconfounded, that is, based on observable pretreatment variables only, 
and that there is sufficient overlap in the distributions of the pretreatment variables 
(Rubin, 1979). 
However, Abadie and Imbens (2003) show that if the control and treated 
groups are insufficiently comparable, then there exists a conditional asymptotic bias 
in the matching estimator, which makes it inconsistent. Hence, to estimate the 
average treatment effect, I follow the bias-corrected estimator in Abadie and Imbens 
(2002), that corrects for asymptotic bias arising from imperfect matching. The 
estimator is implemented using the Stata command match which is described in 
Abadie et. al (2001). 
For the sake of brevity, only the results using this estimator are discussed in 
the following sections. A rigorous analysis of the construction of this estimator is 
given in Appendix 1.D. The estimator construction follows closely the presentation in 








1.4. Empirical results 
1.4.1. Changes in Voting Rights 
   In this section, I document the change in voting rights of cross-listing firms 
after they cross-list on a major exchange in the US via a Level II or Level III ADR 
program. I first examine these changes by classifying firms by their home country’s 
legal tradition. Table 1.3 shows that there is a significant difference in cash flow and 
voting rights, prior to cross-listing, between firms belonging to different legal 
traditions and levels of shareholder protection. It is therefore worthwhile to examine 
if the changes in the legal and regulatory environment that cross-listing firms are 
subject to, upon issuing an ADR, translate into changes in ownership concentration as 
predicted by the rent protection theory of ownership. Finally, I also assess if the 
changes in voting rights are different for different groups of shareholders. The 
purpose is to examine if a US listing affects certain groups of controlling shareholders 
more than other groups.  
 Panel A and B of Table 1.5 report the percentage changes in voting rights at 
the two cut-off levels of 20% and 10% ownership concentration during a six-year 
period (-1,+5) around the cross-listing year. The statistics reported are group means 
for different groups of home countries of the cross-listing firm classified on the basis 
of legal origin. I also report statistics for a comparison sample of benchmark firms 
from each country that do not cross-list.  
 A perfect control sample would be the Level I ADRs that trade on OTC 







or exchange listing rules. However, the lack of SEC filings of these companies makes 
it extremely difficult to find their ownership information. To construct the 
comparison sample, for each cross-listing firm, I find matching firms by industry 
(four-digit SIC) and nearest asset size from Worldscope that did not undertake an 
ADR issue. If there is no match at the four-digit SIC level, I look at three or two-digit 
SIC codes before applying the size criterion. The final restriction for the non cross-
listing firm to be included in the sample is the availability of good ownership 
information from Mergent International and country specific sources. In about 20% of 
the cases, the availability of ownership information over-rides the size criterion. 
Further, to minimize the data collection without losing out on the representative-ness 
of the comparison sample, I adopt the following sampling method: If a country has 
ten or less than ten firms issuing ADRs, I try to identify a match for each of the ten 
firms. However, if the country has more than 10 firms cross-listing in the US, then I 
randomly sample 10 of them and identify comparison firms for each of those. I track 
ownership details for the comparison firms for only two years, the year prior to cross-
listing (of the firm that it is a match to) and four-five years after cross-listing.  
 One of the sample selection issues here is that the cross-listing firms are very 
different from the home country firms that do not cross-list. To address this issue, I 
compare the ownership characteristics of the domestic firms to the cross-listing firms 
prior to their listing in the US. I find that both samples have high concentration of 
ownership structures and family ownership is predominant in both the domestic non-
crosslisting firms and the cross-listing sample. In addition, the mean separation of 







firms that cross-listed in the US had a mean ratio of 0.85 in the year prior to cross-
listing compared to a mean ratio of 0.83 for family owned firms in the control sample. 
Cross-listing firms from French civil law countries had a ratio of 0.86 compared to 
0.84 for control sample firms from these countries. Test of means reveals all statistics 
to be significant at the 1% level. Though these tests show that the ownership profile 
and the potential for private benefits of control is similar in the domestic control 
sample firms and the firms that cross-listed it is difficult to make any causal 
inferences without tackling the endogeneity of the cross-listing decision. 
 Both panels A and B of Table 1.5 report negative but insignificant decreases 
in the year prior to cross-listing (-2, -1). There are highly significant but small 
decreases in voting rights in the year of the cross-listing and thereafter. The largest 
decrease in voting rights in both panels occurs during the (-1, +3) period and this is 
slightly reduced during the (-1, +5) period. For example at the 10% level, voting 
rights decrease by 6.03% during the period (-1, +3) and only by 5.46% during the 
period (-1, +5). Similar results are obtained when the sample size is kept fixed over 
all periods (results not reported). In contrast, for the comparison sample, the results 
show a slight but insignificant decrease of -2.96% (-3.45%) at the 20% (10%) 
ownership concentration level.  
 The cross-listing firms have chosen to cross-list and so it is difficult to see if 
the decline in voting rights can be really attributed to cross-listing. Note that these 
firms could have cross-listed and diluted only their cash flow rights without diluting 
their voting rights. This endogeneity of the cross-listing decision can be handled by 







results of applying the estimators in Abadie and Imbens to the sample of cross-listing 
firms. The values reported are the estimated declines in voting rights over the period 
(-1, +3) relative to the decline in voting rights in the control group. The values reflect 
that there is a significant decline in voting rights in the sample of cross-listing firms 
around the date of cross-listing with the largest being for firms from French civil law 
countries. 
 The results suggest that issuance of an ADR is accompanied by a decrease in 
control rights held by the concentrated shareholder when compared to firms from the 
same country that do not issue an ADR. However, the decrease is definitely not of a 
large enough magnitude to result in a change to a widely held ownership structure. In 
fact, in the fifth year after cross-listing there is actually a slight increase in percentage 
of control rights. 
 Table 1.5 also reveals that the firms from French civil law countries 
experienced the largest decrease in voting rights (-9.38% at 20% level and –9.31% at 
10% level) over the period (-1, +3). These changes are significantly different from 
zero at the 1% level.  In comparison, corresponding numbers for firms from English 
common law countries were –2.52% and -3.39% respectively. The latter firms also 
registered a slight increase in voting rights over the period (-1, +5). Ownership 
changes seem to be the least in Scandinavian and Transition economies.  
 In Table 1.6, I examine the change in voting rights for different types of 
controlling shareholders. The table reports changes in voting rights for the original 
controlling shareholder over different periods of time surrounding the year of cross-







then he is no longer included in the observations.  
 Table 1.6 reveals some important differences between family and state 
controlled firms. I find that family controlled firms experience only a small decline of 
5.8% over the period (-1, +3), which reduces to 3.9% over the period (-1, +5). This 
suggests that family controlled firms reduce their control rights up to year three after 
cross-listing but actually start increasing control thereafter. This could reflect one of 
two things: The controlling shareholders reduce their stake at the time of cross-listing 
to signal their interest in corporate governance and attract more investors but tend to 
reconsolidate soon after. Alternatively, it could also mean that they take advantage of 
the valuation premium associated with cross-listing (Doidge et. al (2003)) and sell a 
part of their stake only to buy back after year three when valuations have returned to 
normal. 
 State controlled firms, on the other hand, experience significant and large 
declines of 17.2% and 22% over the periods (-1, +3) and (-1, +5) respectively. So 
unlike the family controlled firms’ state controlled firms continue to divest their stake 
in year four and five. The large decline in voting rights experienced by state 
controlled enterprises is not very surprising because a lot of privatizations of state-
owned assets have been carried out by issuing American depositary receipts. This is 
especially true for countries in Latin America. The best example is that of the 
Brazilian telecommunication giant Telebras, a $37 billion company. When the 
Brazilian government decided to privatize Telebras in 1998 and break it up into 12 
smaller units, 12 separate ADR issues were established on the New York Stock 







for privatization, apart from wanting to increase investor base is that in many 
countries, the home market is unable to absorb such a large tranche. Hence they are 
compelled to look at international markets to raise capital. On going privatizations 
could also explain the finding that unlike family controlled firms, state controlled 
firms continue to divest their stake in year four and five. 
 Table 1.6 also shows that companies controlled by corporations and widely 
held financial institutions exhibit a similar pattern as family controlled firms. Firms 
controlled by corporations and financial institutions experience large declines in 
control over the period (-1, +3) of 26.7% and 14.5% respectively which reduces when 
over a longer period of (-1, +5). This seems to suggest that cross-listing firms 
controlled by corporations and financial institutions also do a lot of selling and buy-
back around the cross-listing date to take advantage of valuation premiums. The 
larger decline in the case of corporations and financial institutions could reflect the 
lower use of multiple classes of shares in these types of firms. Family owned firms, 
on the other hand, would prefer to use shares with low or no voting rights to take 
advantage of the valuation premium since they value control more. Hence the study 
shows only a small decline in voting right shares in the case of family owned firms. 
These results are robust to the endogeneity of the cross-listing decision as evidenced 
by the last row in each panel. The treatment effect estimators show the largest decline 
for state owned enterprises and some of the least declines for family owned firms.  
 While the decline in voting rights is not significant to result in a widely-held 
ownership structure, there exist other changes in ownership structures as described in 








1.4.2. Changes in Control of Cross-listing Firms 
 In this section, I examine the incidence of control changes taking places in the 
sample of firms that cross list on a major exchange in the United States. A change in 
control is registered when the original shareholder completely divests his stake to a 
new party or if the original controlling shareholder sells a sufficient portion of his 
stake such that he no longer has the maximum percentage of voting rights. A change 
in control is also registered if a widely held firm sees the emergence of a controlling 
shareholder within five years after cross-listing.  
Appendix 1.D shows an example of control change associated with an ADR 
listing in the case of Vimpel-Communications (VimpelCom), which in 1996 became 
the first Russian company to trade on the New York Stock Exchange. The controlling 
shareholder of the company in the year prior to ADR issuance (1995) was the founder 
of the company, Dr Dmitri Zimin, who was also president and CEO.  Dr Zimin 
owned 45% of the cash flow rights of VimpelCom and controlled 58.6% of the 
company’s voting stock. By 2001, VimpelCom had two new majority shareholders: 
Alfa group who controlled 25% plus two shares of VimpelCom’s voting stock via the 
company EcoTelecom Ltd. and Telenor, Norway’s leading telecommunications 
company which controlled 25% plus 13 shares of VimpelCom’s voting stock. 
The full sample characteristics show that roughly 35% of the firms that had an 
original controlling shareholder experience a change in control within five years of 
cross-listing in the US. Panel A of Table 1.7 provides a detailed breakdown of control 







the number of control changes taking place for each type of original controlling 
shareholder and the last row of Table 8 shows the emergence of new controlling 
shareholders. Out of the 78 control changes in the study, most occurred in cases 
where the original controlling shareholder was a family (26 out of 78) or the state (22 
out of 78). The 26 families that exited, transferred control to 7 new families, 8 public 
corporations, one state, 4 widely held financial institutions and 3 changes were 
classified as miscellaneous. Three of the 26 families completely divested their stake 
resulting in a widely held corporation. Overall, 11 of the 78 control changes resulted 
in the original firm becoming widely held.  
Table 1.7 also shows that the largest number of new controlling shareholders 
are widely held corporations and widely held financial institutions. Only 16 of the 78 
control changes resulted in a new family being in control compared to 38 changes to a 
widely held corporation or financial institution.  
Panel B of the table provides a better sense of net changes in controlling 
shareholder types. The table shows the change in controlling shareholder type from 
prior cross-listing to post cross-listing for the sample of firms that underwent control 
changes. There is a total decrease of 11.7% and 24.2% in the presence of family 
controlled and state controlled firms respectively, over the period (-1, +5) indicating 
that these types of controlling shareholders are most likely to sell their stakes on 
cross-listing. On the other side, the controlling shareholder that emerges most after a 
control change is a widely held corporation or a widely held financial institution. This 
implies there is a degree of movement away from state and family ownership in some 







An interesting result from panel B is that 45.3 % of control changes result in a 
foreigner being in control. This seems to indicate that a US cross-listing provides a 
way for the domestic controlling shareholder to divest his stake to a foreign owner. 
Empirical studies have shown that cross-listing on a highly liquid market like the US 
increases visibility (Merton’s (1987) investor recognition hypothesis) and also sends 
out a good signal that the firm believes in good corporate governance because it is 
bonding to greater transparency (Coffee (1999) and Stulz (1999)). These two features 
would make it easier for a controlling shareholder to sell his control block to a foreign 
owner.  
Table 1.8 presents a comparison of the pre-listing characteristics of companies 
that cross-list with those that do not cross-list. While Panel A presents results for the 
complete sample, panel B splits the cross-listing sample into firms that undergo a 
control change and those that do not. Both the panels table compute the difference in 
median values for some important balance sheet variables such as leverage, total 
assets, return on assets, total asset growth and foreign income growth. The differences 
are computed by estimating a median quantile regression (LAV) on a constant, a time 
dummy variable which captures time relative to the year of cross-listing as well as 
control dummies for calendar year, industry and country. I investigate two relative 
time periods: PRELISTING (year before cross-listing) and CLYEAR (year of cross-
listing). 
Panel A of Table 8 reveals some significant differences between cross-losting 
firms and domestic firms both in the year prior to cross-listing and the year of cross-







income growth rates than non ADR issuing firms. The table also shows them to have 
higher ROAs and Tobins Q ratios. On doing treatment effects with the Abadie-
Imbens estimator, it is observed that while the pattern in assets, leverage and growth 
rates is maintained, the  ROA and Tobins Q results are much weaker. Panel B reveals 
interesting patterns for the firms that undergo a control change and those that don’t. 
All cross-listing firms seem to be significantly larger than companies that do not 
cross-list. This finding is consistent with Pagano, Roell and Zechner (2002) who 
argue that there exist economies of scale in cross-listing which increases with 
company size. The company growth variables show that there cross-listing is 
associated with high growth rates for the firms. Total asset growth peaks in the year 
before (or in the year of) cross-listing for both samples of companies that undergo a 
control change and those that do not. The foreign income growth variable is also 
significantly larger for all cross-listing companies compared to the control group. 
There is also some evidence linking international presence to a control change 
because the foreign growth rates for the firms that undergo a control change are larger 
than the growth rates for companies that do not undergo a control change, and this is 
borne out by the treatment effects estimator.  
The table also shows the difference in leverage ratios for the two samples 
relative to the control sample. A significant finding of the table is that the leverage 
ratios of the firms that undergo a control change are significantly higher in the year of 
the cross-listing and five years later, indicative of a different ex-ante selection story. 
One would normally expect that firms with low leverage are more profitable and 







listing firms who also undergo a change in control structure experience an increase in 
their debt capacity. 
Tobin’s Q ratios are significantly higher for all cross-listing firms in the year 
prior to cross-listing but this difference remains only for firms that do not undergo a 
control change. In fact, firms that undergo a control change in this sample are found 
to have a decreased Tobin’s Q ratio in the year of the cross-listing. Finally, the return 
on asset measure is significantly higher for all cross-listing firms only in the year of 
cross-listing. This is suggestive of window dressing by the ADR issuing firms. When 
we look at the treatment effects for the ROA and Tobins Q measure, only the high 
Tobins Q of the no control change firms persists. While earlier research (Pagano, 
Roell and Zechner (2002), Doidge et. al. (2003)) document an increased ROA and 
Tobins Q in all cross-listing firms vis-à-vis domestic firms, this table shows that on 
controlling for endogeneity of the cross-listing decision, only the firms that do not 
undergo a control change exhibit increased Q ratios. 
 
1.4.3. Predicting Control Change from Company Characteristics 
 The descriptive statistics discussed in the last two sections provide some 
evidence that there is a change in the identity of the controlling shareholder in firms 
that cross-list in the US. In this section I turn to more rigorous regression analysis to 
investigate the control changes in detail. I use duration analysis to determine which 
company characteristics predict a control change and multinomial logit analysis to 
predict when control change results in a foreign shareholder. I also use multinomial 







restrictions on foreign direct investment on control change. 
 In Table 1.9, the determinants of a control change occurring within five years 
of cross-listing are analyzed using a Cox proportional hazard rate model. This 
methodology is useful in predicting discrete events (recorded as failures) in a panel 
setting and has been used by Pagano et. al (2002) in examining the decision by firms 
to cross-list. It estimates the effects of a set of covariates X influencing the 
probability of undergoing a control change at time t (the probability is referred to as 
the hazard rate h(t)). The model is written as: 
 h(t)=ho(t) exp (X'β)       (1) 
where β is a vector of coefficients and ho(t) is the baseline hazard rate (that is the 
hazard rate when all X variables are set to 0). The Cox proportional hazard rate 
estimator is a semi parametric estimator and is referred to as proportional hazard 
because it assumes that the hazard ratio h(t)/ho(t) is constant for any two firms at any 
point in time.  
         Table 1.9 reports the estimates as exponentiated coefficients (exp (β1), 
exp(β2),…) rather as coefficients (β1, β2, ….), because exponentiated coefficients can 
be readily interpreted as the effect of unit change in independent variable X on the 
hazard ratio h(t)/ho(t).  
The set of determinants include both firm-level characteristics and 
characteristics of the home country of the cross-listing firm. One of the important 
predictors of control change is the capital structure of the company. Mitchell and 







could make adjustments in ownership necessary. Consistent with this view, are 
empirical studies that document a takeover or exit when the firm is faced with 
increasing leverage and financial pressure (Zingales, 1998; Powell, 1997). Therefore I 
investigate to what extent TASTGR (total asset growth), FINCGR (foreign income 
growth) and LEVERAGE predict the probability of a control change. A highly 
levered foreign company facing financial pressures is more likely to go bankrupt than 
to find buyers in the international market. 
Another determinant of control change associated with cross-listing is the 
SIZE of the firm. Shleifer and Vishny (1992) argue that the market for corporate 
control is less liquid as firm size increases. Bethel et al. (1998) and Mulherin and 
Boone (2000) provide empirical evidence that smaller firms are more likely to 
become takeover targets. Therefore size of the cross-listing firm could be an 
important determinant of whether or not it undergoes a control transfer. Recent 
evidence, not associated with cross-listing, shows that control transfers are more 
likely when the performance of the company or business unit is below the industry 
benchmark (Bethel et al., 1998; Denis and Sarin, 1999; Maksimovic and Phillips, 
2001). Therefore I include Tobin’s Q Ratio to investigate if low valued firms undergo 
more control transfers than high Q firms. 
I also include AGE of the firm as a determinant variable of ownership 
changes, where age is defined as the year of cross-listing-year the company was 
founded in. On one hand, older firms have more entrenched owners and are less likely 
to completely divest their control stake via an ADR compared to younger firms. On 







typically much older than younger firms and could drive the result in the opposite 
direction. The identity and complexity of ownership structure also poses a barrier to 
control transfers. For instance, state owned enterprises in the course of privatization 
may be mostly interested in cross-listing because of the possibility of control transfers 
unlike manager-owned firms where selling the control stake amounts to a loss of 
organizational capital and private benefits. Further, existence of structures like dual-
class equity and cross ownership could deter control changes (Bebchuk et. al., 2000) . 
Hence I include dummy variables for identity of the owner (FAMILY, STATE, 
CORPORATION, FINANCIAL INSTITUTION and MISCELLANEOUS) and a 
dummy variable called CONTROL which takes the value 1 if there is the use of a 
control enhancing feature such as dual-class equity, pyramidal ownership, or cross-
shareholding 
Finally, recent law and finance literature has emphasized the importance of 
legal origin, financial development and property rights protection in determining the 
prevalence of ownership structures in a particular country (LLSV 1997, 1999). 
Hence, I also use lagged values of the following country-level variables:  GDPCAP is 
the log of GDP per capita of the home economy, TVT_GDP is stock market total 
value-traded to GDP which is defined as total shares traded on domestic stock market 
exchange to GDP, COMMON is a legal origin dummy which takes the value 1 for 
English common law countries and 0 otherwise, PROPERTY is the property rights 
regulation index from LLSV (1999) and the Index of Economic Freedom, and is a 
measure of the degree to which the government protects private property, and 







(2004), constructed from the International Monetary Fund’s annual report, Trade and 
Exchange Restrictions. This is a composite index constructed by taking into account 
five types of control restrictions on international transactions. Thus, this measure is 
reflective of the openness of a country’s economy. The standard errors and p-values 
are adjusted for clustering on companies to allow for dependence of errors concerning 
the same company.  
 Table 1.9 shows that the variables that have the greatest impact on a control 
change occurring are size of the company and leverage. A unit increase in leverage 
decreases the relative hazard of a control change by 78.7 % and a unit increase in size 
increases the probability of a control change by 19.3% respectively. This suggests 
that larger companies and companies with less debt are more likely to undergo a 
control change. While consistent with the theory that investors are reluctant to buy 
control blocks in highly levered companies, the result also questions the hypothesis 
that larger firms are less likely to undergo control changes. But this result is probably 
reflective of the fact that it is the larger companies who are able to cross list outside 
the home market and take advantage of increased visibility to facilitate a control 
change. 
 When we look at the identity of the original controlling shareholder, the table 
shows that state-owned enterprises and family owned firms are highly likely to 
undergo a control transfer on cross-listing (35.3% and 21.2% respectively). 
Surprisingly, the presence of control enhancing features is not a strong deterrent to 
the likelihood of control transfer.  







by just 0.8% (significant at 0.001 level). This seems surprising at first because one 
would expect investors wanting to buy control blocks in companies with high market 
valuation. But a high market valuation also implies that the concentrated shareholder 
is more reluctant to sell his control block and hence there are a lesser number of 
control changes in these companies. It is also consistent with findings for US 
companies that control transfers occur mainly in poorly performing companies. I also 
find that foreign income growth enters significantly into the regression. An increase 
in foreign income growth results in an increase in the probability of a control change 
by 7.8%. The table however doesn’t reveal if the foreign income growth predicts a 
control change to domestic or to foreign shareholders. This issue is addressed in 
Table 1.10.  
 Among the country-level characteristics, I find that the economic size and 
liquidity of the home country’s economy have a large positive and significant effect. 
This suggests that it is easier to sell control blocks if the home country’s economy is 
big and the stock exchange is very liquid. Further, control change is less likely in 
English common law countries, which is to be expected because most of the cross-
listing firms from these nations do not have a concentrated shareholder and Table 1.7 
reveals very few changes from a widely held ownership structure to concentrated 
ownership on cross-listing. The extent to which a government protects private 
property and enforces laws to protect private property also seems to be determining 
factor of control changes. Cross-listing firms are less likely to sell their control blocks 
to a new controlling owner on cross-listing if their home market is protective of 







countries that have poor property rights protection. I also find the interesting result 
that a unit increase in capital control restrictions decreases the probability of a control 
change by almost 8.8%. Therefore probability of a control change on issuing an ADR 
is decreased if the home country’s economy is not very open and is subject to severe 
capital control restrictions. Firms from such economies are not very attractive to 
investors even after they issue an ADR.  
 
1.4.4. Emergence of a new foreign controlling shareholder 
 This section investigates if control changes result in a foreign controlling 
shareholder. Multinomial logit is used to predict whether a company is more likely to 
experience a control change resulting in a new domestic owner, or in a foreign owner, 
or becomes widely held or does not experience a control change at all. The regressors 
are lagged as before and standard errors are adjusted to allow for clustering.  
 Table 1.10 reports the relative risk ratios when control change results in a new 
domestic owner, a new foreign owner, or in the firm becoming widely held. The base 
line case is when there is no control change. The set of independent variables used are 
the same firm and country-level characteristics used in Table 1.9 with one change. I 
substitute capital control regulations with the level of foreign direct investment, FDI, 
taken from the IMF’s Balance of Payment Statistics and YEARS_LIBER which is the 
number of years since the official date of liberalization of the country (from Bekaert 
and Harvey 2000).  FDI is a measure of foreign direct investment in the recipient 
country scaled by aggregate gross domestic investment.  







characteristics like GDP per capita and TVT_GDP are significant predictors of 
control change to a new domestic controlling owner. Odds that a controlling 
shareholder sells his stake to another domestic shareholder rather than retaining his 
stake is 1.14 times higher if his company is located in a developed economy and is 
13.68 times higher if the stock exchange of the home country has high liquidity.  So 
greater the financial development of the home country’s economy and greater the 
liquidity of the home country’s stock exchange, more companies sell their stakes to a 
domestic controlling owner on cross-listing. On the other hand, odds that the 
controlling shareholder sells his stake to a foreign owner decrease by 98% with each 
1-unit increase in the liquidity of the home market’s stock exchange. This suggests 
that the size and liquidity of the home country’s stock exchange is a significant 
determinant of whether control is transferred to a domestic owner or a foreign owner.  
 Table 1.10 also reveals that increased property rights regulation increases the 
odds of a dispersed ownership structure after cross-listing and decreases the odds of a 
control change to a domestic controlling owner. It has a positive but insignificant 
effect on odds of a foreign controlling owner emerging post cross-listing. This 
suggests that use of an ADR to sell a control block to another shareholder is rare in 
countries that are protective of property rights. This is broadly consistent with recent 
evidence on privatizations. Megginson, Nash, Netter and Poulsen (2001) find that the 
sale of control blocks is easier where governments respect property rights. Hence 
firms in these countries do not need to approach global markets to sell their control 
blocks.  







significant effect on the sale of a control block to a foreign owner. This seems to 
suggest that a foreign sale is easier when the home country is already open to foreign 
investors. I don’t find any of the country level characteristics to be significant 
predictors of the emergence of dispersed ownership structures on cross-listing.  
 Firm-level characteristics, on the other hand, serve as important predictors for 
control change to a widely held ownership structure. Odds of a controlling 
shareholder completely divesting his stake, resulting in a widely held company, are 
higher for companies with higher market valuations. Further, age comes in as a 
significant predictor only for companies moving from a concentrated ownership to a 
dispersed ownership structure (ages decreases the odds by 71%). Further, larger the 
company, less likely it is to move to a dispersed ownership structure.  
 Table 1.10 also shows the firm level characteristics that predict control change 
to a foreign owner. Size and leverage of the cross-listing are highly significant 
indicators of a control change to a foreign owner. The odds are decreased by 37% and 
70% for large firms and highly levered firms respectively. This seems to suggest that 
only small companies and companies with low debt are attractive to foreign investors. 
This both supports and contrasts a recent study by Freund and Djankov (2000) who 
find that foreign investment in Korea is focused on larger firms and firms with low 
debt ratios. However, the authors in that study focus on direct foreign investment and 
not on firms issuing ADRs. In addition, I find that the odds of a new foreign 
controlling owner are 1.15 times higher (increases about 151%) among firms with 
high foreign income growth. The number of years since official liberalization of the 







1.10 reveals that individual firm characteristics are important if a firm wishes to use 
the ADR route to divest to a new foreign owner.  
 One of the main policies that governments use to discriminate between 
foreign and domestic investors is the use of foreign direct investment (FDI) 
restrictions. Hence, a good measure to determine the emergence of a foreign 
controlling shareholder would be to use a measure of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment and foreign ownership of equity in different countries.   However, data on 
this is available only for a small sample of OECD countries. Golub (2003) presents a 
score of overall restrictiveness indicators, RESTRICTION, for OECD countries based 
on regulations in three areas: restrictions on foreign ownership, screening and 
approval procedures used by countries to limit FDI and other restrictions (that include 
constraints on the ability of foreign nationals to manage or work in foreign 
companies, operational requirements, stipulations on nationals forming a majority of 
the board of directors and so on). The score ranges from 0 to 1 with 1 being the case 
when no foreign equity is allowed.  
 Table 1.11 uses the RESTRICTION measure in a multinomial logit regression 
to study its effect on emergence of a foreign controlling shareholder. I find that 
greater the level of FDI restrictions in the country, probability of a control change to a 
foreign owner on issuing an ADR drops by 94%.  
 In summary, sale of control blocks on cross-listing, to shareholders in the 
same country, is largely dictated by the home-country’s stock market development 
and legal environment. However, sale of control blocks to a foreign owner seems to 







the home country. The tables show that an ADR issuance helps small, young firms 
with low debt and a high foreign income growth rate leapfrog the drawbacks of their 
home-country environment and complete a successful block sale on the global 
market.  
 
1.4.5. Ex-Post Characteristics 
 In this section, I examine the effects of cross-listing and control change on the 
subsequent performance of companies. Each variable to be estimated yit (eg: the 
leverage ratio of a company i at time t) is regressed on a set of cross-listing dummies 
as shown below: 
ititititiit YEARYEARCLYEARfy εβββαα +++++= 53 32110     (2) 
where fi  denotes a company fixed effect, CLYEARit is a dummy intended to capture 
the impact of cross-listing of company I, YEAR3it is a dummy corresponding to the 
three years after listing, and YEAR5it is a dummy capturing the permanent shift in the 
dependent variable after cross-listing (takes the value 1 after year3 of cross-listing). 
To eliminate fixed effects, I difference both sides of the equation and estimate Least 
Absolute-Value (LAV) regressions to distinguish between the various impacts.  The 
specification on first-differencing is now: 
ititititit YEARYEARCLYEARy εβββ ∆+∆+∆+∆=∆ 53 321      (3) 
Panel A of Table 1.12 presents the treatment effects calculated using the 
Abadie and Imbens (2002) estimator for the matched sample of cross-listing firms. 







asset and foreign income growth rates, and higher Tobins Q ratios than non-cross-
listing. Most of these results on post cross-listing characteristics are consistent with 
several performance studies of ADRs after cross-listing, including Pagano, Roell, and 
Zechner (2002) and Doidge et. al (2003). However, once the endogeneity of the 
cross-listing decision is controlled for, only the foreign income growth rate and 
Tobins Q effect remains. This is shown in the second column of Panel A, where the 
treatment effects are reported following the procedure discussed in section 1.3.5. 
Tobins Q ratios are higher in the cross-listing sample but the effect is much lower 
after controlling for endogeneity bias. Foreign income growth rates on the other hand 
show a marked increase even after including treatment effects. Panel A presents the 
comparisons between cross-listing and domestic firms only in the third year after 
cross-listing because of the data restriction with the control sample. Surprisingly, the 
changes in profitability (ROA) and total assets are not robust to self selection. 
Panels B and C report the LAV-regression results for cross-listing firms that 
do not undergo a control change and for firms that do undergo a control change 
respectively. The two panels reveal that all firms irrespective of control change 
experience a big increase in total asset growth in the year of the cross-listing. The 
similarities however end here. Total asset growth is seen to reduce in companies that 
do not undergo a control change but increases in companies that do. The companies 
that undergo a control change experience a 23.6 % reduction in total assets 
accompanied by a very high increase in leverage ratios. Companies that do not report 
a control change, on the other hand, experience a 1.4% increase in total assets and a 







       Both samples of cross-listing firms show a peak in total asset growth in the 
year of cross-listing but this growth rate is not sustained in the long run. Foreign 
income growth, on the other hand, is significantly higher for the long-term. This is 
consistent with evidence from Pagano et al (2002) that cross-listing is pursued by 
more export oriented firms and firms wishing to expand in international markets. 
There is also a significant difference in leverage ratios of firms that cross-list 
and undergo control changes and those that don’t. Table 1.12 reveals that firms that 
undergo control changes raise significant amounts of debt in the years after cross-
listing. Two factors could be responsible for this result. The high leverage ratios 
could be associated with foreign firms which issued an ADR as part of privatization. 
Recent privatization literature (Frydman et al 2000) has shown that massive 
restructuring is associated with firms that privatized and sold stakes to foreign owners 
and raising debt could be part of this restructuring process. Another factor that could 
contribute to this is the identity of the new owners. The transition matrix in Table 1.7 
shows that control changes resulted in more financial institutions and corporations 
being in control than a state or a family. So it could be that foreign equity investors 
such as banks also lend to the firm thereby driving the result that firms with control 
changes raise more debt on cross-listing. This is consistent with evidence presented in 
a recent paper by Aggarwal and Klapper (2003) where they report a similar symbiotic 
relationship between foreign ownership and lending in a sample of Indian IPOs. 
Further, companies that undergo a control change also show an increase in 
ROA and a decrease in Tobin’s Q ratio, which is not exhibited by firms that do not 







documented for the whole sample of cross-listing firms in this study (and several 
other studies like Doidge et. al. (2003), Lang, Lins, and Miller (2003)) is generated 
entirely by firms that do not sell their control stakes on cross-listing. In fact, the table 
shows that while the accounting profitability measures shows an increase in 
profitability in companies that undergo a control change, the market valuation of the 
company is seen to reduce. A possible explanation for this could be that if the original 
controlling shareholder is better informed of the future value of the company and he 
uses the amount of equity retained as a signal of company’s value, the divestment on 
the part of the owner is interpreted as a negative signal by the market Leland and Pyle 
(1977). With respect to other firm characteristics, companies that undergo a control 
change after cross-listing seem to become more export-oriented and increase their 
debt capacity substantially  
 
1.4.6. Special Cases: IPOs and Privatizations 
In this section, I consider two special cases: ADR issuing firms that have 
never traded publicly before their IPO on the US market and state owned enterprises 
that privatized through an ADR issuance. Firms that IPO on the US market have 
generated a lot of interest since a spate of IPOs in the early 1990s by Israeli high-tech 
companies on the NASDAQ. As regards privatization, Telefonos de Chile pioneered 
the use of the US securities market for privatization in the year 1990. The following 
subsections present sample characteristics in each case and also discuss changes in 








i. Level III ADR-IPOs 
 While there has been extensive literature on the decision to go public and the 
performance of the company after the IPO, there is limited empirical evidence on 
ownership changes associated with foreign IPOs in the US. 34% of the firms that 
issued Level III ADRs in the sample were initial public offerings.  
A dominant theory about the IPO process is that the owners in control use the 
IPO as an exit option, and as a first stage in the process of selling the company. 
Zingales (1995) argues that the initial owner uses the IPO to optimize his ownership 
structure so as to maximize his total proceeds from the eventual sale of the company. 
Pagano, Panetta and Zingales (1998) provide evidence of this theory by finding that 
there is a high rate of turnover in control in the three years following an IPO in a 
sample of Italian companies. Holmen and Hogfeldt (2003) apply a law and finance 
perspective to the IPO process and document that while institutionally controlled 
firms use the IPO as an exit option, a majority of Swedish IPOs use dual class shares 
to form control blocks at the IPO to secure and protect valuable private benefits on 
control. Black and Gilson (1998) also show that the exit option offered by an IPO is 
crucial for the development of the venture capital industry.  
All of these studies are based on the domestic IPO market in the country. 
Rock (2001) is one of the first papers to explore the possibility of using an 
international market as an exit option in the context of Israeli companies going public 
on the NASDAQ. The reasons why a firm issues an ADR, as discussed in section 
1.2.2, also apply to a foreign firm doing an initial public offering in the US via an 







market. If the IPO were being used as an exit option, the benefits associated with an 
ADR listing like greater liquidity and investor recognition would make an IPO in the 
US market an attractive option to foreign firms. In the context of this paper, it would 
be particularly interesting to see if IPO issuing firms decrease their voting rights more 
than non-IPO issuing firms and if the majority of control changes occurring in the 
sample is due to the IPO firms.  
Prior to conducting an IPO in the US, firms had concentrated ownership 
patterns similar to other firms that did not issue IPOs, only much higher. Most of the 
IPOs in the sample were family controlled and had a high percentage of mean voting 
rights (65 %) prior to the ADR listing as compared to firms that did not IPO as part of 
their ADR issue (47 %). Further, most of the IPOs were from French civil law 
countries. Post cross-listing, the mean decline in voting rights for IPO issuing firms is 
about 14.25 percentage points over the period (-1, 5), which is much higher than the 
declines for the non-IPO issuing firms. Probit regressions of the probability of decline 
in voting rights on an IPO dummy after controlling for firm size and the original 
owner’s voting rights in t-1 show that the coefficient of the IPO dummy comes in 
positive but insignificant. This suggests that while controlling shareholders of IPOs 
divest by a larger amount on an ADR listing, they are not more likely to do so than 
non-IPO issuing firms.  
When we look at the change in controlling shareholder of ADRs that were 
initial public offerings, 22 of the 78 control changes happened in IPO issuing firms, 9 
of which were originally state-owned enterprises. 13 of these control changes were to 







potential exit option are initial public offerings. The controlling shareholder dynamics 
of IPOs are shown in Panel C of Table 1.7.  
The post listing characteristics of the IPOs show that ADR IPOs are followed 
by a significant increase in foreign income growth rate in the year of cross-listing 
which persists over the longer term, albeit to a smaller extent. The return on assets 
measure shows a decline but is not significant in any of the regressions. Panel D of 
Table 1.12 shows that the ADR-IPOs exhibit a significant decline in leverage 
suggesting that the new capital raised on US equity markets is being used to decrease 
leverage in these firms. Comparing ADR-IPOs that underwent a control change to 
other ADR issuing firms that underwent a control change, there seems to be no 
evidence of an increase in leverage in the former sample unlike the case in the latter.  
 
ii. Privatizations 
Privatization, defined as the deliberate sale by a government of state-owned 
enterprises or assets to private economic agents, became the forefront of economic 
policy in many countries during the 1990s following the perceived success of the 
British privatization program in the early 80s. One of the important privatization 
programs was the one adopted by Chile where for the first time, Telefonos de Chile 
used a large American depositary receipt share tranche targeted towards US investors, 
thus opening up an important pathway for developing country governments to access 
US capital markets. Since then, ADRs have been increasingly used in the Share Issue 
Privatization process (SIP) by privatizing governments both in developed and 







financial market development is often an explicit objective of privatization programs. 
In this regard, approaching a foreign market like the US seems to be a paradox. 
However there are several reasons why foreign governments may choose to use the 
ADR market as a vehicle for privatization. Privatizing governments that are trying to 
establish credibility of their privatization programs may seek certification through 
international offerings. Foreign governments are also drawn to the ADR market both 
because of its sophisticated market infrastructure and also because their domestic 
markets are not liquid enough to absorb the large tranches of shares that are issued as 
part of the privatization process. Bortolotti, Fantini, and Scarpa (2000) conduct an 
exclusive analysis of foreign governments’ motivations to sell equity abroad. While 
there have been some studies comparing the performance of ADR privatizations with 
other ADRs, this is the first study to look at corporate governance related changes in 
these companies. 
The companies that underwent privatizations through their ADR issues are 
identified from the deals listed in Privatization International Yearbooks. This data is 
also confirmed from William Megginson’s webpage6 that contains a detailed list of 
share issue privatizations from 1961-2000 including those that issued ADR securities 
as part of their privatization process. There are 25 companies that privatized via the 
ADR market in our sample.  
A look at the post-listing characteristics shows that there is a significant 
decline in mean voting rights (-32%) over the period (-1, +5) and an even greater 
decline in mean cash flow rights (-59%). Despite the huge declines, only five of the 
                                                 








25 companies underwent control changes within five years after the ADR issuance 
(start of privatization) and none of the 25 companies sold their shares piecemeal as 
part of the ADR listing.  
On the other hand, in the majority of the companies, the state continues to be a 
controlling shareholder with a majority stake. In addition, most of the governments 
continue to hold on to a ‘golden share’ that allows them to counter management 
decisions and block business moves. A classic example is the case of the largest 
privatization in Hungary and in Central and Eastern Europe. One of the successors of 
the Hungarian Post was MATAV whose shares were traded simultaneously on the 
Budapest and New York stock exchanges. While MATAV was eventually sold to 
MagyarCom (currently owned by Deutsche Telekom), the Hungarian government 
continued to hold a golden share in MATAV. 
Panel E of Table 1.12 shows the effect of privatization via an ADR issue on 
the performance characteristics for the firms from the year of cross-listing to five 
years later. The post cross-listing performance of the privatized companies shows that 
there is a significant increase in ROA and Tobin’s Q measures that persists over the 
long run. This is consistent with recent evidence on the increase in profitability 
reported in privatizations across the world (D’Souza and Megginson (1999). The 
privatized companies also exhibit an increase in foreign income growth rates, similar 
to other ADR issuing firms. An interesting pattern emerges with the leverage. While 
leverage ratios are seen to decrease significantly in the year of cross-listing, the long 
term effect actually shows an increase in leverage ratios. There is also a significant 







over the long term. 
  
1.5. Conclusions 
This paper examines if cross-listing on a US exchange results in a change of 
ownership and control structure for foreign firms. The paper tackles this issue in two 
parts. First it examines if there is a movement from concentrated ownership structures 
to dispersed ownership structures as predicted by recent literature in law and finance. 
The bonding hypothesis by Coffee (1999) predicts that foreign firms cross-list on US 
exchanges to bond themselves to higher disclosure standards and stricter 
enforcement. This implies that cross-listing should be associated with some change in 
governance structure for the foreign firms. The paper shows that there is no such 
mass transformation of ownership structures. Most of the firms that cross-list have 
concentrated shareholdings and continue to do so after cross-listing. This finding 
questions the hypothesis that legal protections provided by cross-listing are effective 
enough to cause firms to change their governance structure.  
Second the paper examines if there any changes in composition of the 
shareholders on cross-listing. The paper finds that an ADR listing facilitates a control 
transfer in a large fraction of firms and 45% of these transfers results in a foreign 
controlling owner on cross-listing. The finding suggests that the ADR is used as a 
vehicle by the controlling shareholder to sell his control block. A listing on a US 
exchange provides him with increased visibility and an increased investor base 








The post listing characteristics of the cross-listing firms reveals that the firms that 
undergo a control change have a large foreign income growth and significantly 
increase their debt capacities post cross-listing. While their return on assets shows a 
permanent positive increase, these firms have a slightly negative Tobin’s Q ratio in 
the long run.  On the other hand, companies that do not undergo a control change do 
not increase their leverage ratios and have high Tobin’s Q ratios in all years after 
cross-listing.  
A possible explanation for the absence of a change in ownership concentration is 
the presence of complementarities between a firm’s selection of governance structure 
and the prevailing institutional environment. As long as foreign issuers are still held 
more accountable to home country laws and are subject to different governance 
standards than domestic US firms, the institutional environment that these firms 
operate in on cross-listing is not very different and hence there is unlikely to be a 
transformation in their governance structures. I turn to a theoretical exploration of 










The table presents summary statistics on the number of cross-listings in the United States by year and by country 
of incorporation. The sample consists of foreign firms that listed their shares on one of the major US exchanges 
(Amex, NASDAQ or NYSE) via Level II or Level III ADR Programs. Only exchange listed ADRs are considered 
because they require specific accounting and disclosure information for a firm to cross-list. Panel A shows cross-
listing statistics by year. Panel B shows the number of firms that were cross-listed from each country. The 
countries are also divided into five categories depending on the legal regime they belong to—English Common 
Law, French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist Law 
 
Panel A: Cross-Listing Statistics by Year 
 
Cross-Listings 
Year AMEX NASDAQ NYSE Total 
1990 0 2 3 5 
1991 0 1 10 11 
1992 0 5 5 10 
1993 1 3 19 23 
1994 1 6 25 32 
1995 0 6 15 21 
1996 0 16 25 41 
1997 0 18 36 54 
1998 0 11 37 48 
1999 1 21 23 45 
2000 0 30 48 78 
2001 0 9 29 38 
2002 1 4 14 19 
Total 4 132 289 425 
 
Panel B: Cross-Listing by Country 
 
  Cross-Listings 
Legal Origin Nation AMEX NASDAQ NYSE Total 
Australia 0 7 6 13 
Ghana 0 0 1 1 
Hong Kong, China 0 5 3 8 
India 0 3 8 11 
Ireland 0 8 5 13 
Israel 0 5 3 8 
New Zealand 0 1 4 5 
Singapore 0 2 0 2 
South Africa 0 5 4 9 
United Kingdom 3 30 41 74 
English Common 
Law 
Total 3 66 75 144 
Argentina 0 3 9 12 French Civil Law 







  Cross-Listings 
Legal Origin Nation AMEX NASDAQ NYSE Total 
Brazil 0 1 29 30 
Chile 0 0 20 20 
Colombia 0 0 1 1 
Dominican Republic 0 0 1 1 
France 0 12 21 33 
Greece 0 2 3 5 
Indonesia 0 0 2 2 
Italy 0 1 10 11 
Luxembourg 0 4 2 6 
Mexico 1 1 24 26 
Netherlands 0 7 18 25 
Peru 0 0 2 2 
Philippines 0 1 1 2 
Portugal 0 0 3 3 
Spain 0 1 5 6 
Turkey 0 0 1 1 
Venezuela 0 0 2 2 
Total 1 33 155 189 
Austria 0 0 1 1 
Germany 0 7 14 21 
Japan 0 10 11 21 
Korea, Rep. 0 3 5 8 
Switzerland 0 2 10 12 
Taiwan 0 2 3 5 
German  
Civil Law 
Total 0 24 44 68 
Denmark 0 1 1 2 
Finland 0 0 4 4 
Norway 0 1 3 4 
Sweden 0 6 1 7 
Scandinavian Law
Total 0 8 9 17 
Hungary 0 0 1 1 
Poland 0 1 0 1 
Russian Federation 0 0 5 5 
Socialist Law 




















Ownership Characteristics of the Cross-Listing Firms 
The table classifies foreign firms that listed their shares on one of the major US exchanges (Amex, NASDAQ or NYSE) on the basis of their country of 
incorporation and their ownership structures. The countries are divided into five categories depending on the legal regime they belong to—English Common Law, 
French Civil Law, German Civil Law, Scandinavian Civil Law and Socialist Law.  The ownership details are reported for the year the firm cross-lists in the US. A 
firm is classified as widely held if it does not have a controlling shareholder in that year. A firm is classified as having a controlling shareholder if it has an ultimate 
owner who controls at least 20% (10%) of the firm’s votes. Panel A (B) presents statistics for the 20% (10%) cutoff level. The identity of the controlling shareholder 
is presented using the classification scheme in La Porta et. al (1999). Panel A also reports the mean age of the firms that cross-list.  Detailed variable definitions and 
the sources of ownership data are presented in the Appendix.  
Panel A: At the 20% cut-off level 
Identity of Controlling Shareholder 










English Common Law 10 144 22 88 32 9 3 8 4 
French Civil Law 19 189 31 35 77 29 16 4 28 
German Civil Law 6 68 28 36 10 8 4 1 9 
Scandinavian Law 4 17 11 7 5 4 1 0 0 
Socialist Law 3 7 24 1 2 4 0 0 0 
Full Sample 42 425  167 126 54 24 13 41 
 
Panel B: At the 10% cut-off level 
Identity of Controlling Shareholder 










English Common Law 10 144 22 71 45 8 7 10 5 
French Civil Law 19 189 31 18 79 36 6 16 33 
German Civil Law 6 68 28 22 17 8 7 1 11 
Scandinavian Law 4 17 11 3 7 5 1 1 0 
Socialist Law 3 7 24 0 3 4 0 0 0 









Cash Flow and Voting Rights of Controlling Shareholders 
The table presents the mean cash flow rights, voting rights and ratio of cash flow to voting rights of all firms that had a controlling shareholder in the year in which 
they cross-listed on a major exchange in the United States. A firm is classified as having a controlling shareholder if it has an ultimate owner who controls at least 
20% of the firm’s votes. Panel A presents statistics for firms classified on the basis of (1) Identity of controlling shareholder: The ultimate owner could be a family 
(or individual), the state, a widely held corporation, a widely held financial institution or could be miscellaneous, which includes business groups, voting trusts, 
foundations et. Al) (2) Legal origin: The firms are classified according to the legal system they belong to into English common law, French civil law, Scandinavian 
civil law, German civil law and Socialist law. The last column presents the difference of means test between cash flow rights and voting rights. 
Panel B presents the mean ratio of cash flow to voting rights for countries classified into several categories: (1) Legal Origin: Countries are classified on the basis of 
English Common Law (dummy=1), French civil law (dummy=1) and German and Scandinavian Civil Law (dummy=1) (2) Law and Enforcement : Countries are 
sub-classified on the basis of (a) High vs. Low Shareholder Rights-The Anti-director rights index (scored 1-6) is an index aggregating shareholder rights and is used 
to distinguish between countries that are protective of shareholders and those that are not. (b) High vs. Low Law & Order Score-Law and Order is an index scored 
1-10 where higher score implies strong law and order tradition and lower score implies weak law and order tradition. The countries are classified into high and low 
based on median values of the Law and Order Scores for the countries in the sample (d) High vs. Low Judicial Efficiency-A high score implies a country with a well 
functional judicial system and a low score implies a poor judicial system. (3) Financial Development: Countries are sub-classified on the basis of (a) Index of 
Financial Structure-Higher Values of this Index imply a more market based financial system. (b) Large vs. Small Financial System-Overall size of the financial 
system is measured as deposit money bank assets and stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. The countries are classified into high and low based on median 
values of the overall size variable for the countries in the sample. (c) Developed vs. Under-developed-Develop is a dummy variable which takes the value zero if 
both priv (claims on private sector by deposit money banks as a share of GDP) and tvt (Total Value traded on the stock market as a share of GDP) are below the 
period mean, 1 otherwise. (3) Transparency: Countries are classified on the basis of the Accounting Standards Index, scored from 0 to 90, where a higher score 
indicates greater disclosure requirement in the countries. 
Panel A: Cash Flow and Voting Rights 
  
Category Cash Flow Rights (%) Voting Rights (%) 
Ratio Test of Means 
 Full Sample 44.76 50.23 0.89 -6.82*** 
 ADR-IPO 59.78 64.97 0.92 -4.36*** 
      
Family 45.67 49.79 0.85 -5.12*** 
State 54.64 57.37 0.94 -2.68*** 
Corporation 47.13 50.38 0.94 -1.80* 




Miscellaneous 40.21 45.87 0.88 -3.23*** 
      
English Common Law 34.86 35.78 0.97 -1.87* 
French Civil Law 49.55 57.47 0.86 -6.76*** 
German Civil Law 42.21 42.26 1.00 -0.05 
Legal Origin 
Scandinavian Civil Law 42.26 55.36 0.70 -2.09* 









Panel B: Ratio of Cash Flow to Voting Rights 
 
Legal Origin 
  Dummy=0 Dummy=1 Test of Means 
English Law 0.87 0.97 -2.39** 
French Civil Law 0.95 0.86 2.95*** 
Scandinavian Civil Law 0.91 0.70 2.55** 
    
Law and Enforcement    
  Low High Test of Means 
Shareholder Rights 0.86 0.95 -2.82*** 
Law & Order 0.85 0.94 -2.80*** 
Judicial Efficiency 0.85 0.94 -3.07*** 
    
Financial Development    
  Low High Test of Means 
Index of Financial Structure 0.86 0.96 -3.39*** 
Overall Size 0.83 0.95 -3.61*** 
Develop 0.80 0.95 -4.77*** 
    
Transparency    
  Low High Test of Means 
Accounting 0.86 0.94 -2.41** 


















Control Enhancing Features of Cross-Listing Firms 
 
The table classifies countries into two groups in each of four categories: (1) Legal Origin: On the basis of legal origin, countries are further classified into (a) 
English Common Law countries or others (b) French civil countries or others and (c) Scandinavian civil law countries or others. (2) Law and Enforcement: 
Countries are sub-classified into (a) High vs Low Shareholder Rights-The Anti-director rights index (scored 1-6) is an index aggregating shareholder rights and is 
used to distinguish between countries that are protective of shareholders and those that are not. (b) High vs. Low Minority Rights-Minority Rights is a dummy 
variable which takes the value 1 if the Company Law or Commercial Code of the country grants minority shareholders a judicial venue to challenge management 
decisions, 0 otherwise. (c) High vs. Low Law & Order Score-Law and Order is an index scored 1-10 where higher score implies strong law and order tradition and 
lower score implies weak law and order tradition. The countries are classified into high and low based on median values of the Law and Order Scores for the 
countries in the sample (d) High vs. Low Judicial Efficiency-A high score implies a country with a well functional judicial system and a low score implies a poor 
judicial system. (3) Financial Development: Countries are sub-classified on the basis of (a) Market vs. Non-market based-Market is a dummy which equals one if 
country has a market based financial system, 0 otherwise. (b) Large vs. Small Financial System-Overall size of the financial system is measured as deposit money 
bank assets and stock market capitalization as a share of GDP. The countries are classified into high and low based on median values of the overall size variable for 
the countries in the sample. (c) Developed vs. Under-developed-Develop is a dummy variable which takes the value zero if both priv (claims on private sector by 
deposit money banks as a share of GDP) and tvt (Total Value traded on the stock market as a share of GDP) are below the period mean, 1 otherwise. (4) 
Transparency: Countries are classified on the basis of the Accounting Standards Index, scored from 0 to 90, where a higher score indicates greater disclosure 
requirement in the countries. In all cases, N represents the number of firms with controlling shareholders in the category, Cross-Shareholding represents the 
percentage of firms which have cross-holdings (if the company owns any amount of shares in its controlling shareholder or in another company in its chain of 
control), Pyramids represents the percentage of firms which have pyramidal ownership structures (where controlling owner exercises control through at least one 
publicly traded company), Single represents the percentage of firms which have only one controlling shareholder, Management represents the percentage of firms 
which have the CEO, board chairman, or vice-chairman from the controlling family and Multiple Shares represents the percentage of firms which have multiple 




Category   N 
Cross 
Shareholding Pyramid Single Management 
Multiple 
classes 
English Common Law 57 0.04 0.47 0.21 0.42 0.05 
Others 205 0.07 0.50 0.42 0.30 0.29 
Test of Means   -0.96 -0.43 -3.05*** 1.57 -3.87*** 
French Civil Law 157 0.06 0.52 0.44 0.32 0.34 
Others 105 0.07 0.47 0.28 0.34 0.09 
Test of Means   -0.31 0.71 2.72*** -0.41 4.91*** 
Scandinavian Law 10 0.30 0.40 0.20 0.40 0.40 
Others 252 0.05 0.50 0.38 0.33 0.23 
Legal Origin 







Category   N 
Cross 
Shareholding Pyramid Single Management 
Multiple 
classes 
Low Shareholder Rights 152 0.07 0.61 0.43 0.32 0.30 
High Shareholder Rights 110 0.04 0.41 0.29 0.34 0.15 
Test of Means   0.38 3.26*** 2.41** -0.23 3.01*** 
Low Law & Order Score 134 0.04 0.57 0.37 0.33 0.37 
High Law & Order Score 128 0.08 0.42 0.38 0.33 0.10 
Test of Means   -1.14 2.25** -0.08 -0.04 5.25*** 
Low Judicial Efficiency 129 0.05 0.53 0.46 0.30 0.37 
High Judicial Efficiency 133 0.07 0.47 0.29 0.35 0.11 
Law and Enforcement 
Test of Means   -0.47 0.88 2.74*** -0.92 5.31*** 
Small Financial System 112 0.05 0.50 0.49 0.38 0.40 
Large Financial System 145 0.07 0.49 0.29 0.29 0.11 
Test of Means   -0.50 0.22 3.23*** 1.20 5.58*** 
Under-developed 97 0.07 0.59 0.46 0.41 0.46 
Developed 158 0.06 0.43 0.33 0.28 0.09 
Test of Means   0.42 2.17** 1.97** 2.04** 7.23*** 
Non-Market Based  105 0.04 0.41 0.37 0.28 0.17 
Market based 157 0.08 0.55 0.38 0.36 0.28 
Financial Development 
Test of Means   -1.24 -2.26** -0.03 -1.39 -1.98** 
Low Accounting Standards 131 0.05 0.55 0.46 0.32 0.36 
High Accounting Standards 131 0.07 0.44 0.29 0.34 0.11 Transparency 
Test of Means   -0.46 1.88* 3.01*** -0.13 4.98*** 


















Changes in Voting Rights Surrounding Cross-Listing-Comparison by Country 
The table shows the changes in voting rights of the largest controlling shareholder for the sample of foreign firms that cross-listed on one of the major US exchanges 
during the years 1990 to 2001. Each firm’s ownership structure is tracked from the year before it lists in the U.S. to five years after the cross-listing. A minimum of 
three years of ownership data is used as a constraint to include a firm in the sample. ∆VR (-2,-1) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder in 
the years prior to cross-listing year(from two years prior to on year prior), ∆VR (-1,0) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –
1 to the year of cross-listing, ∆VR (-1,1) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –1 to one year after cross-listing, ∆VR (-1,3) is 
the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –1 to three years after cross-listing and ∆VR(-1,5) is the change in mean voting rights of 
the controlling shareholder from year –1 to five years after cross-listing . Changes in voting rights are also calculated for a comparison sample for the period ∆VR (-
1,3). For each country in the sample, if the number of firms cross-listing is less than 5, then for each firm, ownership statistics are reported for a matching firm in the 
same industry (four-digit SIC) and nearest asset size which does not cross-list. If the number of firms cross-listing is greater than 5, then the comparison sample is 
generated for a random selection of five cross-listing firms in the country. Results are presented for all firms at the 20% cut-off level and at the 10% cut-off level. A 
mean test is used to test whether the mean change in voting rights is significantly different from zero. The last row in each panel also calculates the treatment effects 
using the procedure in Abadie and Imbens (2002). The values are the estimated changes in voting rights relative to changes in voting rights in the control group. 
Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: At the 20% cut-off level 
Year Relative to Cross-
Listing Year Full Sample Comparison English Common Law French Civil Law German Civil Law 
Scandinavian and 
Socialist Law 
∆VR (-2,-1) -0.41  0.05 -0.82 -0.43 . 
∆VR (-1,0) -2.63***  -2.25** -3.63*** -1.01* -2.36 
∆VR (-1,1) -3.92***  -2.42** -5.98*** -2.77 -2.76 
∆VR (-1,3) -5.76*** -2.96 -2.52* -9.38*** -4.46 -1.16 
∆VR(-1,5) -5.15***   1.96 -9.11*** -8.87 -2.83* 
Treatment Effect 3.20**  - 0.00 4.56** 0.34* 0.01 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Panel B: At the 10% cut-off level 
Year Relative to Cross-
Listing Year Full Sample Comparison English Common Law French Civil Law German Civil Law 
Scandinavian and 
Socialist Law 
∆VR (-2,-1) -0.48   0.13 -1.01 -0.45 . 
∆VR (-1,0) -2.33***  -1.71* -3.41*** -0.81** -2.28 
∆VR (-1,1) -3.65***  -1.96** -5.72*** -2.72* -2.75 
∆VR (-1,3) -6.03*** -3.45 -3.39*** -9.31*** -4.09 -2.2 
∆VR(-1,5) -5.46***   1.08 -9.03*** -9.28* -2.16 
Treatment Effect 3.50**   0.56 7.89*** 1.26* 0.23* 








Changes in Voting Rights Surrounding Cross-Listing-Comparison by Shareholder Type 
The table shows the changes in voting rights of the original controlling shareholder for the sample of foreign firms that cross-listed on one of the major US 
exchanges during the years 1990 to 2001. Each firm’s ownership structure is tracked from the year before it lists in the U.S. to five years after the cross-listing. A 
minimum of three years of ownership data is used as a constraint to include a firm in the sample. ∆VR (-2,-1) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling 
shareholder in the years prior to cross-listing year(from two years prior to on year prior), ∆VR (-1,0) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling 
shareholder from year –1 to the year of cross-listing, ∆VR (-1,1) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –1 to one year after 
cross-listing, ∆VR (-1,3) is the change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –1 to three years after cross-listing and ∆VR(-1,5) is the 
change in mean voting rights of the controlling shareholder from year –1 to five years after cross-listing . Changes in voting rights are also calculated for a 
comparison sample for the period ∆VR (-1,3). For each country in the sample, if the number of firms cross-listing is less than 5, then for each firm, ownership 
statistics are reported for a matching firm in the same industry (four-digit SIC) and nearest asset size which does not cross-list. If the number of firms cross-listing is 
greater than 5, then the comparison sample is generated for a random selection of five cross-listing firms in the country. Results are presented for all firms at the 
20% cut-off level and at the 10% cut-off level. A median test is used to test whether the median change in voting rights is significant. The last row in each panel also 
calculates the treatment effects using the procedure in Abadie and Imbens (2002). The values are the estimated changes in voting rights relative to changes in voting 
rights in the control group. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: At the 20% cut-off level 
Year Relative to Cross-





∆VR (-2,-1) -0.41  0.03 -2.55 1.66 0.85 -1.13 
∆VR (-1,0) -2.63***  -2.60** -7.67*** -6.57 -5.82 -2.31** 
∆VR (-1,1) -3.92***  -2.80** -11.38*** -17.89** -12.54 -3.65 
∆VR (-1,3) -5.76*** -2.96 -5.78*** -17.16*** -26.74*** -14.50 -3.161 
∆VR(-1,5) -5.15***  -3.89* -21.99*** -23.76 -0.68 -6.69 
Treatment Effect 3.20**  2.19 9.89*** 7.89* 3.42 1.93 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Panel B: At the 10% cut-off level 
Year Relative to Cross-





∆VR (-2,-1) -0.48  0.003 -2.88* 1.37 0.62 -0.85 
∆VR (-1,0) -2.33***  -1.75** -7.06*** -4.25 -4.31 -1.55* 
∆VR (-1,1) -3.65***  -2.01** -10.47*** -16.12** -5.31 -2.74 
∆VR (-1,3) -6.03*** -3.45 -4.82*** -16.21*** -21.57** 7.80 -2.36 
∆VR(-1,5) -5.46***  -3.09* -20.59*** -17.92 -6.27* -4.81 
Treatment Effect 3.50**  2.45* 10.67*** 9.86* 2.31 0.81 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Table 1.7 
Controlling Shareholder Dynamics Surrounding Cross-Listing  
The table shows the changes in identity of the controlling shareholder upon cross-listing on a major US exchange during the years 1990 to 2001. Each firm’s 
ownership structure is tracked from the year before it lists in the U.S. to five years after the cross-listing. The original controlling shareholder could be a family (or 
individual), the state, a widely held corporation, a widely held financial institution or miscellaneous, which includes business groups, voting trusts and foundations. 
A change of control is registered in one of the following cases: when the original controlling shareholder divests his entire stake; when the original controlling 
shareholder sells his stake such that a new ultimate owner now has maximum percentage of the voting rights; if there is no original controlling shareholder but a 
controlling shareholder emerges post cross-listing. The new controlling shareholder could again be one of five types: a family (or individual), the state, a widely 
held corporation, a widely held financial institution or miscellaneous, which includes business groups, voting trusts and foundations. Panel A presents the dynamics 
in the identity of the controlling shareholder prior to and post cross-listing. Panel B presents the percentage change in each type of controlling shareholder. Foreign 
is a dummy variable identifying if the controlling shareholder of a firm belongs to a country different from the country of incorporation of the firm. Panel C presents 
the dynamics for Level III ADRs that were also IPOs. Results are presented for all firms at the 10% cut-off level. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given 
in the appendix. 
Panel A: Controlling Shareholder Dynamics 
      Post Cross-Listing 











Family 26 7 1 8 4 3 3 
State 22 2 1 9 4 4 2 
Widely-held 
corporation 9 2 0 2 3 0 2 
Widely-held financial 9 1 0 1 4 0 3 













Shareholder 5 2 1 0 1 1 0 
  Total 78 16 4 20 18 9 11 
 
Panel B: Percentage Changes in Ownership Type from prior to post cross-listing 

















Panel C: Controlling Shareholder Dynamics for Level III ADR-IPOs 
      Post Cross-Listing 











Family 6 2 0 2 1 1 0 
State 9 0 1 3 1 1 3 
Widely-held 
corporation 2 1 0 0 1 0 0 
Widely-held financial 3 0 0 1 1 0 1 













Shareholder 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 









Cross Listing versus Domestic Companies  
The table compares cross-listing companies versus domestic companies that do not cross-list. Panel A presents results for the whole sample of ADRs relative to the 
control sample while Panel B reports the differences in medians of companies that cross-list and undergo a control change, relative to the control sample, and of 
companies that cross-list but do not undergo a control change, relative to the control sample. The differences are calculated using quantile median regressions (LAV) 
where the dependent variable is regressed on a time dummy controlling for calendar year, industry and country effects. The time dummies used are: PRELISTING is a 
dummy variable that takes value 1 for observations taken 1 year before the company cross lists and CLYEAR is a dummy capturing the timing of the cross-listing (1 in 
the year of cross-listing and 0 elsewhere). Each cell in the table below represents a separate LAV regression and presents the coefficients of the time dummies, which is 
the difference in medians. TOTAL ASSETS is the Total Assets of the firm, LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio of the firm, Q is Tobin’s Q ratio given by (market value 
of assets divided by replacement cost), TASTGR is total asset growth, FINCGR is growth in foreign income and ROA is return on assets. Each Panel also reports the 
treatment effects calculated using the procedure in Abadie and Imbens (2002). Detailed variable definitions and sources are given  in the appendix. 
Panel A: ADRs vs Non ADRs 
 Full Sample 
 PRELISTING CLYEAR TREATMENT EFFECTS 
TOTAL ASSETS 1.17*** 1.62*** 1.51** 
TASTGR 5.07** 5.30** 3.23** 
LEVERAGE 2.71**` 3.59** 0.32* 
FINCGR 18.32*** 18.15*** 7.34** 
ROA 1.23* 0.91* 0.34 
Q 5.98** 3.3** 0.21 
 
Panel B: Control Change vs No Control Change 
 Control Change No Control Change 
 PRELISTING CLYEAR TREATMENT EFFECTS PRELISTING CLYEAR 
TREATMENT 
EFFECTS 
TOTAL ASSETS 1.65*** 0.97** 1.14** 1.13*** 1.07*** 1.23** 
TASTGR 4.49** 2.79** 2.16* 3.67*** 5.43*** 4.53** 
LEVERAGE 1.86**` 5.58** 0.45 6.67** 2.86 1.56* 
FINCGR 14.68*** 15.14*** 10.65*** 10.99** 11.00*** 5.68** 
ROA 1.91 0.91* 0.32 -0.31 0.98* 0.23 
Q 6.70** -1.30** 0.26 11.87*** 13.10*** 6.78** 








Predicting Control Change in Cross-Listing Firms 
The table presents the Cox estimates of the hazard ratio of a control change occurring within five years of foreign 
firms cross-listing on a major US exchange. The dependent variable takes the value one in the year of the first 
control change and zero otherwise. A change of control is registered in one of the following cases: when the 
original controlling shareholder divests his entire stake; when the original controlling shareholder sells his stake 
such that a new ultimate owner now has maximum percentage of the voting rights; if there is no original 
controlling shareholder but a controlling shareholder emerges post cross-listing. The independent variables are as 
follows: AGE is the age of the firm from its year of incorporation to the year of cross-listing, SIZE is log of firm’s 
sales, LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio of the firm, Q is Tobin’s Q ratio given by (market value of assets divided 
by replacement cost), TASTGR is total asset growth, FINCGR is growth in foreign income, GDPCAP is log of 
GDP per capita, TVT is total value traded as a percentage of GDP, COMMON is the legal origin dummy which 
takes the value 1 for common law countries and 0 otherwise, STATE takes the value 1 if the original owner is a 
state-owned enterprise, 0 otherwise, FAMILY takes the value 1 if the original owner is a family or 0 otheriwse, 
CONTROL takes the value 1 if there are control enhancing features used suc as dual-class equity, cross-
shareholding or pyramidal ownership structures. PROPERTY is the Property Rights Regulation Index from The 
Index of Economic Freedom. CAPCONTROL is index of capital controls from the IMF’s Trade and Exchange 
Restrictions Report. Lag values of all independent variables are used. Standard errors and resulting p-values are 
adjusted for clustering on companies. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix 
 
No. of subjects  : 1284    
No. of failures   : 78    
Log Likelihood : -265.96    
Wald χ2 (11)       : 48.23    
Prob>χ2 (11)       : 0.000    
  Hazard Ratio Z P>Z 
AGE 0.926 -1.46 0.125 
SIZE 1.193 3.56 0.000 
LEVERAGE 0.213 -1.98 0.033 
Q 0.992 -2.45 0.000 
TASTGR 1.109 1.65 0.113 
FINCGR 1.078 5.53 0.000 
GDPCAP 1.362 2.43 0.011 
TVT_GDP 16.123 4.65 0.000 
COMMON 0.195 -2.03 0.041 
STATE 1.353 2.56 0.000 
FAMILY 1.212 4.03 0.003 
CONTROL 0.889 2.52 0.061 
PROPERTY 0.045 -1.44 0.000 








Predicting the Emergence of Foreign Controlling Owners on Cross-Listing 
The table shows results from a multinomial logit regression that predicts the probability of a control change taking 
place to a new controlling shareholder who is foreign. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes one 
of four values: 1 (for no control change), 2 (when there is a control change to a new domestic controlling owner), 
3 (when there is a control change to a foreign controlling owner) and 4 (when the firm becomes widely held after 
cross-listing). Group 1 (no control change) is the comparison group. The explanatory variables used are described 
as follows: Q is Tobin’s Q ratio given by (market value of assets divided by replacement cost), SIZE is log of 
firm’s sales, LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio of the firm, AGE is the age of the firm from its year of 
incorporation to the year of cross-listing, TASTGR is total asset growth, FINCGR is growth in foreign income, 
GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita, TVT_GDP is total value traded as a percentage of GDP, FDI is the level of 
foreign direct investment taken from IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, PROPERTY is Property Rights 
Regulation Index, YEARS_LIBER is the number of years since the official date of liberalization of the country 
(from Bekaert and Harvey 1999). Lag values of all independent variables are used. The coefficients reported are 
the relative risk ratios. Significance levels of the Z-statistics are also reported. Standard errors and resulting p-
values are adjusted for clustering on companies. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the 
appendix. 
 
Number of observations: 1987       
Log Likelihood: -135.17    
Wald χ2 (38): 194.60    
Prob>χ2 : 0.00    
Pseudo R2 : 0.42    
    
  Relative Risk Ratios 
  
Change to a new 
controlling owner 
(domestic) 
Change to a new 
controlling owner 
(foreign) 
Change to widely 
held 
Q 0.999 0.999 1.002* 
SIZE 1.046* 0.588** 0.025** 
LEVERAGE 0.873 0.295*** 1.022 
AGE 0.992 0.982 0.295** 
TASTGR 0.998 0.999 0.984 
FINCGR 1.003 1.151** 1.002 
GDPCAP 3.321*** 2.518 1.381 
TVT_GDP 13.685** 0.003*** 0.013 
PROPERTY 0.726*** 1.101 1.587*** 
FDI 1.121 1.828*** 1.231 
YEARS_LIBER 0.903* 0.884 0.948 








Effect of FDI Restrictions on Control Change in OECD Countries 
The table shows results from a multinomial logit regression that predicts the effect of restrictions on foreign direct 
investment on control change in OECD countries. The dependent variable is a dummy variable that takes one of 
four values: 1 (for no control change), 2 (when there is a  control change to a new domestic controlling owner), 3 
(when there is a control change to a foreign controlling owner) and 4 (when the firm becomes widely held after 
cross-listing). Group 1 (no control change) is the comparison group. The explanatory variables used are described 
as follows: Q is Tobin’s Q ratio given by (market value of assets divided by replacement cost), SIZE is log of 
firm’s sales, LEVERAGE is the leverage ratio of the firm, AGE is the age of the firm from its year of 
incorporation to the year of cross-listing, TASTGR is total asset growth, FINCGR is growth in foreign income, 
GDPCAP is log of GDP per capita, TVT_GDP is total value traded as a percentage of GDP, FDI is the level of 
foreign direct investment taken from IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, YEARS_LIBER is the number of 
years since the official date of liberalization of the country (from Bekaert and Harvey 1999), RESTRICTION is a 
composite OECD measure of restrictions on foreign direct investment which includes restrictions on foreign 
equity ownership (from Golub 2003). Lag values of all independent variables are used. The coefficients reported 
are the relative risk ratios. Significance levels of the Z-statistics are reported. Standard errors and resulting p-
values are adjusted for clustering on companies. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the 
appendix. 
 
Number of observations:   
Log Likelihood: -67.349   
Wald χ2 (20): 75.39   
Prob>χ2 : 0.00   
Pseudo R2 : 0.36   
  Relative Risk Ratios 
 
Change to a new 
controlling owner 
(domestic) 
Change to a new 
controlling owner 
(foreign) 
Q 0.999** 0.999 
SIZE 1.389*** 0.531 
LEVERAGE 0.876 0.583 
AGE 1.009 0.966 
TASTGR 0.978 0.998 
FINCGR 1.001 1.063* 
GDPCAP 2.629*** 1.09 
TVT_GDP 18.409*** 1.335 
PROPERTY 0.586*** 0.726 
FDI 1.625* 1.873** 
YEARS_LIBER 0.459*** 0.705 
RESTRICTION 5.303 0.061** 








Ex-post listing characteristics 
The table shows the estimates of the ex-post effects of cross-listing distinguishing between firms that underwent a control change and those that did not experience a 
control change. Panel A presents the treatment effects calculated using the procedure in Abadie and Imbens (2002) for cross-listing companies vis-à-vis non-cross-
listing companies. Panel B presents results for companies that did not have any control changes and Panel C presents results for companies that underwent a control 
change. Panel D presents results for ADR issues that were also initial public offerings and Panel E presents results for ADR-privatizations. Each column gives the 
results of a LAV regression for a dependent variable. The explanatory variables are CLYEAR which is a dummy capturing the timing of the cross-listing (1 in the year 
of cross-listing and 0 elsewhere), YEAR3 which is a dummy taking the value 1 in the three years after cross-listing and YEAR5 which is a dummy taking the value 1 
after the third year). A constant, country on incorporation and calendar year dummies are also included but the coefficients are not reported here. First differences of all 
variables are taken to eliminate fixed effects. Detailed variable definitions and sources are given in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: ADR vs Non-ADR Sample 
  1 






Total Assets 0.521 0.321 
Total Assets Growth 3.14* 0.003 
Foreign Income Growth 0.22** 4.567** 
Leverage -0.11 0.246 
Return on Assets 0.14** -0.050 
Tobin's Q 4.612*** 1.423** 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
Panel B: No Control Change 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Total Assets Total Assets Growth 
Foreign Income 
Growth Leverage Return on Assets Tobin's Q 
Year of Cross-Listing 0.045 6.790*** 0.225** -0.090*** 0.53 0.987 
Three-year effect -0.016 0.06 0.312** 0.002 -0.33*** 1.023* 
Five-year effect 0.014 -2.35 0.556** -0.025 -0.12 2.194** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.05 0.00 0.00 
N 1567 1470 1362 1293 1436 1171 







Panel C: Control Change 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Total Assets Total Assets Growth 
Foreign Income 
Growth Leverage Return on Assets Tobin's Q 
Year of Cross-Listing 0.035 7.880*** 2.178** -0.086 0.42 0.235 
Three-year effect 0.057 0.16 1.222** 1.003* 1.07 -1.246 
Five-year effect -0.236** 1.14 2.289*** 2.669*** 0.580* -1.632*** 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.04 0.01 0.00 
N 412 351 368 406 365 325 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Panel D: Level III ADR IPOs 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Total Assets Total Assets Growth 
Foreign Income 
Growth Leverage Return on Assets Tobin's Q 
Year of Cross-Listing 0.023 1.55** 1.280*** -0.069 -0.059 0.139 
Three-year effect 0.057 -2.45 1.295*** -0.094** -0.21 0.176 
Five-year effect 0.063 -3.75 2.729** -0.135** -0.15 0.124 
Pseudo R-squared 0.03 0.01 0.00 0.04 0.03 0.00 
N 137 132 131 137 135 125 
*, ** and ***  represent significance at 10%, 5% and 1% level respectively 
 
Panel E: Privatizations 
  1 2 3 4 5 6 
  
Total Assets Total Assets Growth 
Foreign Income 
Growth Leverage Return on Assets Tobin's Q 
Year of Cross-Listing -0.102* 0.234 1.230** -0.078* 0.130** 0.957** 
Three-year effect -0.219** 0.678 2.300*** 1.023* 0.250** 1.260* 
Five-year effect 0.028 1.140 1.456*** 1.357** 0.45* 1.450* 
Pseudo R-squared 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.03 
N 25 25 25 25 25 25 















Ownership Variables  
Widely held Equals 1 if there is no controlling shareholder. Control is measured following LLSV (???) 
Family Equals 1 if a person or family is controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise 
State Equals 1 if domestic or foreign state is controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise 
Widely-held corporation Equals 1 if a widely held non-financial company is controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise 
Widely-held financial Equals 1 if a widely held financial company is controlling shareholder, and zero otherwise 
Miscellaneous Equals 1 if above five categories are zero. Includes pension funds, voting trusts, groups, non-profit organizations and 
employees 
Cross-Shs Equals 1 if firm has a controlling shareholder and owns shares in its controlling shareholder or in firm that belongs to 
the chain of control, zero otherwise 
Pyramid Equals 1 if controlling shareholder exercises control through at least one publicly traded company, and zero otherwise 
Single Equals 1 if firm has a 20% (or 10%) controlling shareholder and no other shareholder has control of at least 10 percent 
of the votes 
Management Equals 1 if controlling shareholder is also CEO, Chairman, Vice-Chairman of the Board, and zero otherwise 
  
  
Firm-level Variables  
AGE Time since the date of incorporation of the company 
SIZE Log of Sales. Source: Worldscope 
LEVERAGE Total Assets/ Shareholder's Equity. Source: Worldscope 
TASTGR Total Asset Growth. Source: Worldscope 
FINCR Foreign Income Growth. Source: Worldscope 
Q Tobins Q Ratio ((Market Value of Equity+Long Term Debt)/Replacement Value(Net property, plant & 
equipment+Inventory). Source: Worldscope 









Country-level Variables  
GDPGROWTH Growth in GDP per capita. Source: World Development Indicators 
TVT_GDP Total Value of Stocks Traded as a percentage of GDP. Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database 
FDI Foreign Direct Investment. Source: IMF Balance of Payments Statistics 
YEARS_LIBER Time elapsed since the official liberalization date of the country. The official liberalization dates are reported in  
PROPERTY The degree to which property rights are protected in the economy. Source: Heritage Foundation 
RESTRICTION OECD Measure of FDI restriction for each country. The total score ranges from 0 to 1 and is based on regulations in 
each of three areas: (1) Restrictions on foreign ownership (2) Obligatory screening and approval procedures used to 
limit FDI (3) Other formal restrictions including constraints on the ability of foreign nationals to manage or work in 
affiliates of foreign companies and other operational controls on these businesses. Source: Golub (2003) 
CAPITAL CONTROLS Index of Capital Controls. Source: IMF Trade and Exchange Restrictions Report;Harrison, Love and McMillan(2002) 
ACCOUNTING Index created by examining and rating companies' 1990 annual reports on their inclusion or omission of 90 items in 
balance sheets and income statements and published by the Center for International Financial Analysis & Research Inc. 
the maximum is 90, the minimum is 0. 
SHAREHOLDER RIGHTS An index aggregating the shareholder rights. The index is formed by adding 1 if : (1) the country allows shareholders to 
mail their proxy to the firm; (2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares prior to the General Shareholders' 
Meeting; (3) cumulative voting or proportional representation of minorities in the board of directors is allowed; (4) an 
oppressed minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to 
call for an Extraordinary Shareholders' Metting ie less than or equal to 10 percent; or (6) shareholders have preemptive 
rights that can only be waived by a shareholder's vote. Source: LLSV 1999 
RULE OF LAW Measure of the law and order tradition of a country. Ranges from 1(weak) to 10(strong). Source: International Country 
Risk Guide 
JUDICIAL EFFICIENCY Assessment of the efficiency and integrity of the legal environment as it affects business. Scale from 0-10. Source: 
LLSV 1999 
OVERALL SIZE Overall size of the financial system (Deposit money bank assets and stock market capitalization as share of GDP). 
Source: World Bank Financial Structure Database 
MARKET Index of Financial Structure. Higher values indicate a more market based system. Source: Beck et. al(2000) 














Sources of Ownership Data 
 Country Years Sources 
All Countries 1990-2002 Worldscope, Hoovers Online, Lexis-Nexis, ISI Emerging Markets Database 
   
Country Specific Sources   
Argentina 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Argentina  Argentina Company Handbook 1995-1996 
Argentina  Emerging Markets Handbook 1997 
Australia  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Australia  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
Australia  Jobson's Year Book of Public Companies 99-00 
Austria 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Austria  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Austria  www.transnationale.org 
Belgium  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Brazil 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Brazil  Brazil Company Handbook 97/98, 01/02 
Chile 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Colombia 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Denmark 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Denmark  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Dominican Republic 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Finland 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Finland  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Finland  Guide to Nordic Stock Markets 
Finland  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
France 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
France  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
France  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Germany 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Germany  Major Companies of Europe 2002 







 Country Years Sources 
Greece  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Greece  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Hong Kong 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
Hong Kong  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Hong Kong  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
India 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
India   
Indonesia 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
Indonesia  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
Indonesia  Emerging Markets Handbook 1997 
Ireland  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Israel  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Italy  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Italy  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Japan  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Japan  Morningstar Japan, July 1992, 1994 
Japan  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
Luxembourg  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Malaysia  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Malaysia  Kuala Lumpur Stock Exchange Annual Companies Handbook 1996 
Mexico 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Mexico  Mexico Company Handbook 1995-96 
Netherlands  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Netherlands  Dutch Company Handbook 1998-99 
New Zealand  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
New Zealand  Jobson's Year Book of Public Companies 99-00 
Norway 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Norway  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Norway  Guide to Nordic Stock Markets 
Peru 1995 Major Companies of Latin America and the Caribbean 1997, Graham and Whiteside Publication 
Philippines 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 







 Country Years Sources 
Portugal  Major Companies of Europe 2002, Portuguese Stock Exchange 1993 
Portugal  Europe's Top Quoted Companies, Emerging Markets Handbook 1997 
Russia  Russian Equity Guide 96-97, Brunswick Brokerage' 
Russia  Russian Equity Guide 2000-01 
Singapore 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
Singapore  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Singapore  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
South Africa 1996, 1997, 1998 McGregors's Who Owns Whom in South Africa, 1998 Listed and Unlisted Companies, McGregor Publication
South Africa 1994, 1995, 1996 McGregors's Who Owns Whom in South Africa, 1996 Listed and Unlisted Companies, McGregor Publication
South Korea 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
South Korea  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
South Korea  Korea Company Handbook Investment Guide, Daewoo Securities Co., Ltd. 
South Korea  Emerging Markets Handbook 1997, Korea Company Handbook 2000 
South Korea  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
Spain 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Spain  Major Companies of Europe 2002, Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Sweden 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Sweden  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Sweden  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Switzerland 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
Switzerland  Major Companies of Europe 2002 
Switzerland  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
Taiwan 1996, 1997 Asian Company Handbook 1999, Toyo Keizai Publication 
Taiwan  Major Companies of Far East and Australasia 2002, Graham & Whiteside Gale Group 
Taiwan  Emerging Markets Handbook 1997 
Thailand  Asia Pacific Handbook 1999, Primark Publication 
UK 1998, 1999 European Handbook 2000, Primark Publication 
UK  Europe's Top Quoted Companies 
UK  Major Companies of Europe 2002 













GDP per capita is the real GDP per capita averaged over the period 1990-1999. TVT_GDP is Total Value of Stocks Traded as a percentage of GDP averaged over 
1990-99. COMMON is a dummy variable which takes the value1 for English common law countries and 0 for others. PROPERTY is the Property Rights 
Regulation Index from The Index of Economic Freedom. CAPCONTROL is index of capital controls from the IMF’s Trade and Exchange Restrictions Report, 
averaged over 1990-96. FDI is the level of foreign direct investment taken from IMF’s Balance of Payments Statistics, averaged over 1990-99. RESTRICTION is a 
composite OECD measure of restrictions on foreign direct investment which includes restrictions on foreign equity ownership (from Golub 2003).  
 
Nation GDP/CAP (US $) TVT_GDP COMMON PROPERTY 
CAPITAL 
CONTROL LEVEL OF FDI 
(OECD) FDI 
RESTRICTION 
Argentina 7440.86 0.04 0 4 3.00 2.59 . 
Australia 20498.74 0.29 1 5 0.08 1.82 0.33 
Austria 29344.73 0.07 0 5 0.55 1.07 0.43 
Belgium 27304.92 0.09 0 5 0.40 2.20 0.29 
Brazil 4298.29 0.13 0 3 2.43 1.58 . 
Chile 4389.20 0.08 0 5 2.75 5.19 . 
Colombia 2289.70 0.01 0 3 3.89 2.14 . 
Denmark 34167.82 0.20 0 5 0.40 2.47 0.16 
Dominican Republic 1588.07 . 0 2 . 2.89 . 
Finland 26289.28 0.23 0 5 0.50 1.96 0.46 
France 26986.50 0.23 0 4 1.40 1.66 0.23 
Germany 30004.38 0.27 0 5 0.08 0.58 0.17 
Ghana 373.57 0.00 1 3 . 1.34 . 
Greece 11455.06 0.24 0 4 . 0.96 0.33 
Hong Kong, China 21994.46 1.15 1 5 0.00  . 
Hungary 4526.60 0.10 0 4 . 4.65 . 
India 375.75 0.08 1 3 3.50 0.39 . 
Indonesia 966.93 0.09 0 3 1.00 1.06 . 
Ireland 18767.87 0.28 1 5 1.30 5.22 0.25 
Israel 15343.58 0.18 1 4 2.00 1.24 . 
Italy 19050.73 0.14 0 4 1.40 0.35 0.26 







Nation GDP/CAP (US $) TVT_GDP COMMON PROPERTY 
CAPITAL 
CONTROL LEVEL OF FDI 
(OECD) FDI 
RESTRICTION 
Korea, Rep. 10261.01 0.58 0 5 1.89 0.67 . 
Luxembourg 44015.98 0.03 0 5 .  . 
Mexico 3346.84 0.12 0 3 2.08 2.21 . 
Netherlands 27063.04 0.58 0 5 0.00 4.12 0.24 
New Zealand 16165.58 0.13 1 5 0.00 4.05 0.24 
Norway 33227.32 0.18 0 5 1.50 1.74 0.47 
Peru 2121.17 0.04 0 3 2.43 3.07 . 
Philippines 1090.42 0.16 0 4 3.00 1.72 . 
Poland 2880.74 0.04 0 4 . 2.39 . 
Portugal 10980.78 0.13 0 4 1.38 2.02 0.22 
Russian Federation 2630.33 0.02 0 3 . 0.53 . 
Singapore 22510.88 0.75 1 5 0.00 10.44 . 
South Africa 3921.59 0.21 1 3 4.00 0.96 . 
Spain 15025.36 0.42 0 4 1.54 1.89 0.23 
Sweden 27400.20 0.44 0 4 0.70 5.35 0.34 
Switzerland 44520.43 1.22 0 5 . 2.04 0.28 
Taiwan, China 12141.17 2.62 0 . .  . 
Turkey 2782.34 0.21 0 4 3.63 0.46 0.39 
United Kingdom 19360.10 0.60 1 5 0.00 2.77 0.17 













Example of change in ownership structure 
 
VIMPEL COMMUNICATIONS 
Date of incorporation: 1992 
ADR Listing: 11/01/1996  
Listed on NYSE as Level III ADR  
Depositary: Bank of New York 
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Bias-Corrected Matching Estimator 
The following section describes the use of the matching estimator in Abadie 
and Imbens (2002) to examine the effect of cross-listing. For firm I, i=1,….,N, let 
(Yi(0), Yi(1)) denote the potential outcomes, where Yi(0) is the change in firm 
performance when the firm is not exposed to the treatment (does not cross-list) and 
Yi(1) is the change in firm performance when the firm cross-lists: 
 
 
where Wi , Wi ε (0,1) indicates whether the firm cross-listed. 
If both Yi(0) and Yi(1) are observable, then the effect of the treatment on firm 
i would be Yi(1)- Yi(0). However for a given firm, either Yi(0) or Yi(1) will be 
observable. The average treatment effect on the treated i.e. the average effect of 
cross-listing on performance for the sample of firms that cross-lists is given by: 
[ ]1 1| (1) (0) |W WE Y Yτ = == − ,  
Since τ|w=1 is inherently unobservable, to obtain a consistent estimate, 
matching estimators assume that assignment to treatment is unconfounded, that is, 
assignment to treatment is independent of the outcomes, conditional on the pre-listing 
covariates. More rigorously, W is independent of (Yi(0), Yi(1)) conditional on X=x.  
Here is the construction of a simple matching estimator:  
Let ||x||V  ≡ (x′V x)1/2 be the vector norm with positive definite weight matrix 
(0)   if 0
( )















V. Let dM(i) be the distance from the covariate value for firm i, Xi to the Mth nearest 
match. Allowing for the possibility of ties, this is the distance such that fewer than M 
firms are closer to firm i than dM(i),and at least M firms are as close as dM(i). If there 
are no ties there would be exactly M matches as close to Xi as dM(i). 
Let ζ M (i) denote the set of indices for the matches for firm i that are at least 
as close as the Mth match. If there are no ties the number of elements in ζ M (i) is M. 
Let the number of elements of ζ M (i)  be denoted by ζ M (i). Finally, let KM (i) denote 
the number of times firm i is used as a match given that M matches per firm are used, 
divided by the total number of matches. Σ KM (i) = N, the total number of 
observations in the sample, including both cross-listing firms and non control sample 
firms. 
The first estimator, the simple matching estimator, uses the following 
approach to estimate the pair of potential outcomes. For each firm i the observed 
outcome gives us one of the two potential outcomes. The other, unobserved, potential 
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The simple matching estimator for the average treatment effect for the treated 

















= −∑ ,  
where N1  is the number of treated units.  
The following example with just four firm observations illustrates the 
construction of the matching estimator. Assume that matching is on the basis of the 
size of the firm (total assets in millions of dollars). Therefore, Xi={60,40,70,10} for 
each of the four firms. The cross-listing dummy plays the role of Wi in identifying the 
treatment and the control variables. The dependent variable, Yi is the profitability in 
year 3 after cross-listing (year 0). The Ŷi(0) for the treatment firm is essentially the Yi 
of the matched control firm and the Ŷi(1) for the treatment firm is the same as Yi. 

























1 1 60 10 Firm 3 2 8 10 2 
2 0 40 5 Firm 1 1 5 10 5 
3 0 70 8 Firm 1 1 8 10 2 
4 1 10 5 Firm 2 0 5 5 0 
 
The estimated average treatment effect is =(2+5+2+0)/4=9/4 
 
The above estimator is biased in finite samples when matching is not exact. A 
bias  corrected estimator adjusts the difference within the matches for the difference 







conditional mean of Y(W), ( )Wm x  on X. 
0 1( )Wm x b b x= +  
Since we are interested in estimating the sample average treated effect for the 
treated, we need to estimate the above regression only for the control observations, 
0 ( )m x . If ˆ ( )Wm x  be the fitted value of ( )0 1ˆ ˆ( ) using ,wm x b b , then the bias adjusted 
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Chapter 2. Effect of Investor Protection and Strategic 




Recent academic papers in law and finance have established the importance of 
better legal protection of minority investors for corporate governance. In a series of 
papers, La Porta, Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (henceforth LLSV) and 
several other authors show that the level of investor protection influences ownership 
concentration (LLS 1999, Claessens et al. 2000), amount of external equity financing 
(LLSV 1997) and debt-equity ratios (Friedman, Johnson and Mitton 2003).  
This significant and enormous literature has however proved inadequate on 
three fronts, each of which is addressed by this paper. First, to fully assess the impact 
of investor protection and to design an optimal corporate governance mechanism, we 
need to jointly consider the incentives of not just shareholders but also managers and 
creditors. Hence, the policy implications from existing empirical literature has been 
limited since it focuses on only “one group of actors, small outside investors” in the 
corporate governance problem (Berglof and Von-Thadden 2000). This paper 
addresses this issue by looking at several agency conflicts simultaneously.  
Second, and surprisingly, this literature hasn’t examined if there is any kind of 
clustering between the choices of corporate governance in different countries. For 
instance, why do countries with poor investor protection have firms with concentrated 
ownership structures and low dependence on external financing and low dividend 







influences the adoption of the other and vice versa? There exists enough empirical 
evidence to suggest that this is an important question. For instance, Friedman et. al 
(2000) show that during the East Asian crisis, firms with a pyramidal ownership 
structure performed better if they also issued more debt. This paper uses a lattice 
theoretic model that allows us to examine if there exists a monotone relation between 
a firm’s choices of ownership structure and leverage and the firm’s regulatory 
environment.  
Finally, the current literature has examined the effect of legal protection on 
the ability of managers and entrepreneurs to divert profits from outsiders at a cost. 
But poor legal protection refers not only to poor shareholder and creditor rights but 
also to poor accounting standards and the lack of transparency. This paper presents a 
new approach to thinking about investor protection by examining its effect on the 
monitoring costs and incentives of the different investors in the firm. Poorer the 
accounting standards and transparency, greater the monitoring costs borne by 
investors in terms of auditing costs and implementing mechanisms to reduce 
information asymmetry. Focusing on this aspect of investor protection, in contrast to 
earlier studies that model investor protection as a cost of stealing technology, is 
important for corporate governance reform because it provides a more implementable 
measure of reform (Alba, Claessens and Djankov (2003)). Recent empirical evidence 
has also emphasized the importance of this channel by showing that the effect of 
investor protection on monitoring costs is important for new business creation 
(Hytinnen and Takalo 2001) and risk sharing (Giannetti 2002).  







ownership, leverage and creditor monitoring are complementary instruments7 in 
corporate governance in an environment of poor investor protection. In an 
environment of poor regulation and poor accounting standards and no transparency, 
costly monitoring is a way to tackle the problem of managerial moral hazard. 
However, in a diffusely held corporation, no individual finds it worthwhile to 
monitor. So a model of costly monitoring requires shareholders to hold large 
ownership stakes.  
But while concentrated ownership encourages monitoring activities by large 
investors, it leads to a potential loss in risk-sharing benefits that are realized when 
ownership is diffuse (Admati, Pfleiderer, and Zechner 1994). Greater the ownership 
stake in the firm, greater is the owner’s exposure to avoidable idiosyncratic risk 
(Shleifer and Vishny 1997)8. Therefore, the flip side to concentrating ownership is 
that it comes at the opportunity cost of making the owner (risk averse) more sensitive 
to firm-specific risk. To counteract this effect of ownership concentration9, the paper 
proposes an addition of debt to the capital structure. Higher leverage would allow the 
owners to share the downside risk of the firm with creditors, while allowing them to 
retain any increase in upside potential due to increased monitoring (Jensen and 
Meckling 1976). Leverage therefore encourages the owners to take on larger stakes in 
the firm, which, in turn, enables them to internalize more of the benefits of 
                                                 
7 To say that two or more instruments are Edgeworth complements is to say that the marginal benefit derived from 
a given instrument is an increasing function of the extent to which complementary instruments are employed 
together with it. Consequently, complementary instruments tend to reinforce and support each other. 
8 Concentrated ownership structures ar very prevalent through most of Europe and Asia. For instance, Reliance 
Industries Ltd., a $12 billion company headquartered in India is 70% owned by the Ambani family. The Ambanis 
would be the most affected, compared to other shareholders if the performance of this company were to decline. 
9Most studies with the exception of Huddart (1993) and Himmelberg et al (2001) have concentrated on how a 
large ownership stake makes the return more significant to the shareholder without discussing its impact on the 
risk sensitivity of the large shareholder. Maug (1998) calls this a lock-in effect which commits the large 








monitoring. In other words, the marginal benefit of concentrating ownership increases 
at higher levels of debt and creditor monitoring in an environment of poor investor 
protection.  
The paper also shows that high ownership concentration and high leverage 
give rise to low dividend payouts when the regulatory system is not very protective of 
minority shareholders. Therefore, the dividend policy of a firm is influenced by not 
just the extent of investor protection in the country as LLSV (1998) establish but is 
jointly determined with the firm’s selection of its ownership and capital structure.  
Further, the paper extends the recent LLSV results in examining the effect of 
investor protection on the contracting mechanism of a firm. Why is the Asian 
business landscape dotted with business groups and network structures like the 
chaebol, keiretsu and quanxi10 unlike the formal organizations found in the west? The 
paper shows that a complementary cluster of high ownership concentration, high 
leverage and low dividend payouts is also associated with reliance on business groups 
and network structures rather than on formal contracting mechanisms. Thus, this 
paper extends the reach of the law and finance literature in showing how these 
complementarities predict organizational form.  
To test some of the implications of the complementarity hypothesis in this 
paper, I use data from Amadeus Database that provides balance sheet information for 
European firms. Using the correlations based approach described in Arora (1996) and 
implemented by Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003), 
I show that ownership concentration and leverage are complementary instruments in 
                                                 








the transition economies. The downside of using the Amadeus database is the lack of 
variables to proxy for monitoring undertaken by creditors. Hence the paper is 
restricted to testing the complementarity hypothesis between ownership and leverage. 
However, lattice theory mathematics allows us to focus on a subsystem of decisions 
to study complementary relations while taking the rest of the organizational variables 
as given.  
The complementary relationships studied in this paper have significant 
implications for government policy on corporate governance reform which is 
elaborated in Section 6. By establishing the systemic nature of corporate governance, 
the paper shows that regulators need to tackle all dimensions of the organizational 
form for their reforms to have full effect. In the presence of complementarities, 
changing one policy variable may have no effect or an undesirable effect if other 
policy variables remain unchanged. This explains why one-dimensional policies such 
as the Transparency Directive adopted by the European Commission have been 
ineffective (ECGN 1998).  
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2.2 places the paper in 
context of recent work in this area. Sections 2.3 describes the model and the 
methodological approach. Section 2.4 discusses extensions to the basic model. 
Section 2.5 presents the empirical evidence and discusses additional empirical 
predictions. Section 2.6 concludes with policy implications.  
2.2. Related Literature 







international evidence to show that cross-country differences in corporate 
governance, and more broadly in financial systems are shaped by the quality of legal 
rules protecting investor rights. In a multitude of empirical studies, various authors 
have shown that common law countries provide better investor protection than civil-
law countries (LLSV 1998), are more dependent on external equity financing than 
civil-law countries (LLSV 1997). In contrast, countries with poor investor protection 
are associated with concentrated ownership (LLS 1999, Claessens 2000), higher 
private benefits of control (Zingales 1994, Nenova 1999) and low dividend payouts 
(LLSV 2000a).  
Despite the enormous amount of empirical evidence discussed above, 
theoretical work in this area is still in its infancy. Shleifer and Wolfenzon (2002) 
present a market equilibrium model of owner-managers and consider the relationship 
between legal protection and inside equity. Himmelberg et. al. (2002) theoretically 
and empirically study the relationship between investor protection, ownership, and 
the cost of capital. Other studies model ownership structure to explain concentration 
of ownership and control. Wolfenzon (1999) and Bebchuk et. al. (1999) argue that 
pyramids, cross shareholding structures, and dual class shares are conducive to the 
extraction of private benefits and are more common in environments with poor 
investor protection. Burkart et. al. (2002) analyze the influence of law on the 
founder’s decision to hire a professional manager.  
However this first generation of corporate governance papers fails to study 
inter-dependencies between the various results. The main focus in these papers has 







policy implications (Berglof and Von Thadden 2000). John and Senbet (1998) also 
advocate considering the role of creditors to broaden the focus of corporate 
governance to include additional agency problems. 
In this paper, I examine the inter relationships between these various results 
and their impact on corporate governance. I model several agency conflicts 
simultaneously, allowing for the fact that any one governance instrument can mitigate 
an agency problem at the expense of aggravating others. This gives rise to 
complementary and substitution relationships between the various instruments. The 
paper is closest, in this respect to John and Kedia (2002) who design an optimal 
governance system using managerial ownership, large shareholders and bank 
monitors and the takeover market. However, in contrast to them, I use a lattice 
theoretic model to obtain an exact formalization of complementarities without 
considering takeover mechanisms.  
This paper is also closely related in modeling strategy to Burkart and Panunzi 
(2001) who analyze the interaction between legal shareholder protection, 
blockholder’s incentives to monitor and managerial incentives. While the Burkart and 
Panunzi (2001) paper speaks of a initiative effect, in that concentrated ownership 
stifles managerial initiative in increasing net shareholder return, our paper speaks of a 
risk altering effect of ownership concentration. Increased ownership stake in the firm 
exposes the owner to increased idiosyncratic risk reducing his monitoring incentive. 
Himmelberg et. al. (2002) also investigate the risk shifting effect but examine its 
implications for cost of capital.  







approach towards understanding the effects of investor protection–on the monitoring 
incentives of various investors. Most other papers model investor protection as a 
punishment technology for stealing by the manager. But investor protection not only 
refers to shareholder and creditor rights but also to the presence of good accounting 
standards and transparency in the country. In fact, policy makers refer to 
strengthening the monitoring mechanism in place when they speak of improving 
investor protection.11 Alba, Claessens and Djankov (2003), in assessing Thailand’s 
policy options for improving corporate governance recommend improving bank 
monitoring of enterprise management. This paper therefore follows recent work by 
Giannetti (2002) in modeling monitoring costs as a function of investor protection.  
Further, while the other models acknowledge the link with the incomplete 
contracting literature, this model is one of the first to link the results on investor 
protection with the kind of contracting mechanisms that firms adopt. Thus the paper 
also contributes to the transaction cost literature (Williamson 1985) and the more 
recent literature on the business group style contracting mechanisms in emerging 
markets (Khanna and Palepu (2000a), Kali (1999), Khanna and Yafeh (2000)). Table 
2.1 provides a brief summary comparison of some of the theoretical models in the 
area of law and corporate governance.  
 
                                                 
11 The SEC’s Advisory Committee on Capital Formation and Regulatory Processes in crafting a system that 
enhanced investor protection incorporated measures that improved monitoring by outside directors, underwriters, 








2.3. The Model 
In this section, I present a framework for simultaneously examining the 
agency conflicts between shareholders, creditors and managers. To begin with, 
assume each firm makes decisions on ownership structure,λ , leverage ratio, d , and 
the level of investor monitoring, m . The regulatory environment of the firm is 
represented by the variable parameter T .  The firm faces the following  




m d m T
λ
λΠ , , ;     (2.1) 
where Π  is a general specification of firm value. For different values of the 
parameterT , the firm selects its decision variables ( )d mλ, ,  to maximize value.  
The agency issues that this model is intended to address are as follows: The 
central problem in corporate governance is managerial moral hazard. Managers can 
be motivated to exert high effort and not steal by giving them incentive 
compensation. However, designing of incentive contracts involves a risk-incentive 
trade-off (Hart and Holmstrom (1987)) for the shareholder, with the source of risk 
being the imperfect measurement of managerial effort. This can be reduced by using 
monitoring to acquire a true signal of managerial effort. So monitoring by the owners 
is intended to shift risk away from the managers to themselves while leaving total 
firm risk (exogenous in our model) unchanged.  
The costs of monitoring are obviously dependent on the severity of the agency 
problem and therefore on the regulatory parameterT . The costs are higher when there 







manager. In addition, monitoring being a public good is associated with free rider 
problems. The solution to free-rider problem in the case of costly monitoring is 
concentrated ownership. However, concentrated ownership comes at an opportunity 
cost of making the owner (risk averse) more sensitive to firm-specific risk, which 
decreases his incentives to monitor. This paper proposes the use of leverage as a risk 
sharing partner for the large owner. Specifically, creditors share in the downside risk 
of the firm and also play an important monitoring role in the system. Therefore the 
model predicts that in countries with poor investor protection, firms with concentrated 
ownership structures issue more debt and allow for a stronger monitoring role by the 
creditors.  
The above model of firm behavior includes more generality than can be used 
to capture the various agency problems discussed and to exhibit complementarities. 
Subsections 2.3.1-2.3.3 below contain a specialization of the model in (1) and 
subsection 2.3.4 analyzes the specialized model under hypotheses that yield 
monotone optimal solutions.  
 
2.3.1. Distribution of Cash Flows  
This subsection formulates a model of a value maximizing firm that operates 
over two time periods. At date 0, the firm is set up by the owners and contracts are 
drawn up between the owners, managers and the creditors.  
Consider an investment project that requires an initial outlay of funds, I  at 







finance: the contribution from the owners, oI  and the money raised from the creditors 
in the debt market, dI . The total funds invested in the firm is given by o dI I I= + . 
Each owner also has an ownership stake given by 
1
1 1ni ii nλ λ, = ,... , = ,∑  where n  is 
the number of owners. Ownership concentration is measured by λ  which is the 
largest iλ . The manager is assumed to have no equity stake in the firm. At date 0, the 
manager issues debt of face value D . The timeline of cash flows is shown in Figure 1.  
The manager chooses to exert an effort 1e  in choosing a particular investment 
project. Effort is unobservable. The project has a life of two periods. At date 1, the 
states of nature are realized and the project yields a return of X  with probability α  
and a return 0  with probability 1 α− .  At date 2, return Y  is realized. The date 1 cash 
flow is observable but not verifiable. A court could therefore not enforce a contract 
contingent on these realized cash flows. This assumption is meant to capture the idea 
that managers have some ability to divert the corporate resources towards perquisite 
consumption or unprofitable investment projects at the expense of the owners.  
As shown in Bolton and Scharfstein (1990, 1996) and Gertner, Scharfstein 
and Stein (1994), the optimal contract calls for a repayment of debt D  at date 1; if the 
manager has the cash flow X  and chooses not to make the payment D,  the creditor 
has the right to liquidate the project. In this case, the manager would have to forfeit 
his share in the third period payoffY .  
The project can also be liquidated if date 1 cash flow is 0  instead of X . The 







Therefore, liquidation yields a value 1( )L e ,  where 1( )L e Y< . Given that liquidation is 
always assumed to be inefficient, the manager and creditor are expected to 
renegotiate to avoid liquidation. The possibility of ex-post renegotiation is recognized 
at the initial contracting stage. So any outcome that could be achieved through 
renegotiation is anticipated and implemented in the original contract. Therefore the 
value of D  that must be repaid is renegotiation proof. The proceeds from liquidation 
are distributed between the managers and the creditors. It is assumed that employee 
claims are satisfied before residual shareholder claims and that owners get nothing in 
this model.  
At the end of the first period, a decision is made whether to continue the 
project or to liquidate it. Continuation means that the project has an economic value 
at date 2 ,Y , and this date 2  value depends on managerial effort in periods 1 and 2, 
1e and 2e . Further, Y  is a random payoff which can be described by its mean 1 2( )y e e,  
and variance, 2yσ  :
2
1 2[ ( ) ]yY ~ N y e e σ, , . Since Y  is observed with some noise, it is not 
a true estimate of managerial effort. Hence the owner is reluctant to base the 
manager’s compensation onY . Instead, he undertakes monitoring to acquire a more 
precise signal of managerial effort.  
 
2.3.2. Investor Protection and Monitoring Incentives  
The owner expends resources om  in monitoring the manager at per unit cost 
oc  to obtain an informative signal Z  of managerial effort. Monitoring is intended to 







the owner to tailor the manager’s pecuniary award more closely to actual performance 
than to profits. From Holmstrom’s “informativeness principle” (Holmstrom 1979, 
1982), the manager’s compensation contract should be based on the more informative 
signal Z  rather than onY . So managers get Zθ  and owners getY Zθ− .  
One of the intended consequences of monitoring here is to increase the share 
of risk borne by the owner and to decrease the risk borne by the manager without 
changing the total firm risk (which is treated as exogenous in this model). This allows 
incentive compensation to achieve its true goal of motivating the manager to exert 
high effort. To see this, suppose the signal Y  could be represented as  
1 2 1 2 2( ) (1 )o o oY y e e m m Z mη η η= , + − + ≡ +   
where 1η , 2η  
2(0 )~ N ησ,  and are iid. The owner, by expending resources om , is able 






∂ < .   
Unlike previous literature where monitoring costs are assumed to be constant, 
I assume that the monitoring costs, oc  incurred by the owner is a function of the 
owner’s ownership concentration, λ  and the level of legal shareholder protection,T . 
The parameter T  captures the regulatory environment in the country. Following 
LLSV (1998), T  could be considered a proxy for the extent of shareholder and 
creditor rights protection, the quality of accounting standards and the enforcement 
mechanism in the country. A high value of parameter T 12 corresponds to a highly 
                                                 
12 Note that T  could very easily have been interpreted as a parameter vector, so it could include all regulations 
pertaining to shareholder rights, creditor rights, property rights protection, stock market regulation, even 
intellectual property rights protection. So in general, T  is best thought of as a proxy for the laws and enforcement 







transparent market with stringent accounting rules and disclosure requirements and 
regulations protecting the rights of the minority shareholders while low values of the 
parameter T  correspond to markets where disclosure rules, accounting standards and 
investor protection are less stringent. As LLSV (1998) show, high values of T  are 
typically associated with common law countries and low values of T  are associated 
with civil law countries.  
Creditors also undertake monitoring resources dm  at a cost ( )dc T .  A weak 
bankruptcy law combined with poor accounting standards could mean managers can 
conceal the true financial situation of the firm implying a higher monitoring cost to 
creditors. Therefore, oc  and dc  may be interpreted as the cost of gathering and 
processing information about the firm and that is inversely related to the quality of 
accounting standards in the country. Monitoring costs have been modeled similarly in 
Giannetti (2002) and Hyytinen and Takalo (2001). This gives us our first assumption:  
Assumption A1: Monitoring costs are decreasing with better investor protection. 
0ocT
∂




∂ < .   
Creditor monitoring and investor protection also affect the liquidation value. 
Greater the monitoring resources spent by the creditor, dm , the better able he is to 
ensure that more is left in the firm on liquidation and not everything is stolen by the 
manager. Alternatively, greater creditor monitoring can be thought of as ensuring 
more collateral to be safe. Also greater the investor protection, higher the share in 
liquidation value that creditors get. LLSV (1999) show that in their sample of 49 
countries, in the event of bankruptcy, “nearly half of the countries do not have an 








automatic stay in assets, over half restrict the managers’ right to seek protection from 
creditors unilaterally, and 45% remove management in reorganization proceedings”. 
This implies that both the level of bankruptcy regulation (proxied by parameter T  in 
this model) and the amount of monitoring undertaken by the creditor, dm  determines 
what the creditors receive on liquidation. This is easily modeled by assuming the 
following functional form for L. 
( ) ( )o dL L m Tδ=   
such that (0) (0) 0o oL L δ= , =  and (1) 1δ = .  The level of investor protection affects 
the share in liquidation value that creditors get and the amount of creditor monitoring 
affects the base liquidation value. Therefore, we have the following assumption:  
Assumption A2: Liquidation value accruing to creditors is increasing in the extent of 






∂ >  and 0LT∂∂ > .   
 
2.3.3. Design of a Corporate Governance System  
Following sub-sections 2.3.1 and 2.3.2, I now discuss the utility payoffs for 
each of the parties involved. I assume that both the principal (owner) and the agent 
(manager) are risk averse with constant absolute risk aversion:  
( ) exp( )U P RP= − −                                                                                       (2.2) 
( ) exp( )U A rA= − −                                                                                          (2.3) 
where r  and R  are the coefficients of risk aversion for the agent and the principal 







be written in certainty-equivalent form. The expected certainty equivalent payoffs of 
the various stakeholders are as follows:  
2 1[ ] (1 )(1 ) ( )




Manager X D Z e L e m T
rVar d m m
α θ α γ
θ λ
,: − + − + − − ,
−
                           (2.4) 
The first term reflects the manager’s payoff if the project yields a return X  in 
the first period and Y  in the second period. The manager makes debt payment D  
from the first period payoff, receives share Zθ  of the second period payoff and 
action in the second period is assumed to be costly. The second term reflects the 
manager’s payoff in the event of liquidation. The last term is the risk premium, R . I 
do not write out the expression for R : it is a function of the coefficient of risk 
aversion, r;  the manager’s share in third period payoff, θ;  his share in the liquidation 
value, 1 γ− ;  and the variance of third period payoff, 2 ( dy mσ , )om . The variance is in 
turn a function of the monitoring intensity dm  and om .   
The certainty equivalent of the owner is given by:  
1[ ] ( ) ( )
2o o o d o
Owners Y Z c T m I RVar d m mα θ λ θ λ: − − , − − , , , ,                      (2.5) 
The owner receives his share Y Zθ−  of second period payoff with a 
probability α.  He also expends some cost on monitoring the manager, ( )oc Tλ,  and 
invests oI  in the firm. The creditors don’t share in either of the two project returns X  
andY . Instead their payoff is completely determined by the debt repayment and the 
liquidation value. In the event the project gives a return X , the creditor gets his debt 







equivalent of the creditor is given by:  
1(1 ) ( ) ( )d d d dCreditor D L e m T c T m Iα α γ λ,: + − , − , −                                      (2.6) 
When value is expressed using certain equivalents, this is a transferable utility 
model, so an arrangement is efficient if and only if it maximizes total value. That is, 
regardless of the other terms of the contract, it is possible to take a dollar of utility 
from one party and transfer it to the other party just by transferring a physical dollar. 
And Holmstrom and Milgrom (1990) show that with such a transferable utility model, 
any efficient contract must maximize the sum of the individual utilities or the joint 
surplus13. Therefore the objective function being maximized is the total certainty 
equivalent given by:  
        Manager Owner CreditorTotal CEQ CEQ CEQ CEQ= + +                                            (2.7) 
1 2 2 1max [ ] [ ( ) ] (1 ) ( ) ( )
1 1( ) ( ) ( )
2 2
CEQ d o d o o
d d d o d o o d
e m m d X y e e e L e m T c T m
c T m RVar d m m rVar d m m I I
θ λ α α λ
λ θ λ θ λ
,Π , , , , , = + , − + − , − ,
− , − , , , , − , , , , − −
 
subject to the manager’s optimal choice of effort.  
The manager’s effort choice will be characterized by a set of first-order 
conditions that uniquely define the agent’s response function, denoted 
( )d oe m m dθ λ, , , , .  When this response function is substituted into the objective Total 
CEQ, the problem is reduced to an unconstrained optimization over the organizational 
choice variables ( )d om m dλ θ, , , , . 
                                                 
13 Note that the cited result applies to any model with constant absolute risk aversion (including risk neutrality of 
all parties). Further one could as well maximize the agent's objective function subject to the principal getting zero 
profits (or any other individual rationality restriction). It still leads back to total surplus maximization, because the 
only feasible welfare weight is one. The solution will not be first best because it is chosen subject to the incentive 







Therefore, the objective function being maximized is CEQΠ  which is a 
function of the design variables conditional on parameters reflecting the institutional 
environment. The design variables in our problem are  
(i) the ownership concentration, λ   
(ii) capital structure, d   
(iii) and monitoring levels dm  and om .   
(iv) the incentive compensation parameter θ   
The parameter T  captures the regulatory environment.  
 
2.3.4. Comparative Statics  
Our general objective is to determine how the design instruments in 
( )o dd m mλ θ, , , ,  co-vary across a set of agency relationships. This requires that 
explicit parameters of CEQ Total  be introduced that characterize the heterogeneity of 
the firms being studied. The parameter I consider is T ,  a proxy for the legal and 
regulatory environment in which the firm operates. I am interested in performing 
comparative statics to characterize how the choice of ( )o dd m mλ θ, , , ,  varies withT . 
The most common method for comparative statics analyses is based on 
applying the implicit function theorem to first order conditions. To do this, one 
usually needs to make some assumptions on convexity of sets or conditions regarding 
the positive or negative definiteness of the Hessian. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) 
argue that these assumptions ‘play as servants to a method and they couldn’t be 







comparative statics are fundamentally statements of order-statements of the form that 
an increase in some variable leads to increases in other variables. They propose an 
order-theoretical method of doing comparative statics. In particular, they show that in 
a problem with a lattice structure14, having complementarities among the variables is 
sufficient for the monotonicity of a firm’s choice variables in its exogenous 
characteristics. And a function which exhibits complementarity between its 
arguments is termed as a supermodular function.  




∂ ∂ > . 
(See Appendix 2.B for some of the results on supermodularity from Topkis (1998) 
that we need for our analysis) In this form, supermodularity reflects 
complementarities between the variables: when one goes up, the marginal return from 
increasing the other variables also goes up. Supermodularity also implies that if all 
the variables of a supermodular function are increased simultaneously, the function 
value increases by more than if we were to sum up the value changes from increasing 
the variables one at a time.  
This implies that to establish complementarity between the various decision 
variables, we need to show that ( )total o dCEQ d m m Tλ, , , ,  is supermodular. 
Representing ( )o dd m mλ, , ,  by x , if ( )totalCEQ x T,  is supermodular, then an increase 
in T (or any component of T if T is a vector) will trigger a sequence of upward 
adjustments in the components of x, all of which reinforce each other. The only 
requirement needed here is to impose some kind of ordering on the variables. For 
ownership structure, I focus on two possibilities, concentrated or dispersed, denoted 
                                                 
14 A lattice is a partially ordered set in which every subset containing exactly two elements has a greatest lower 







by { }c dλ λ λ∈Λ ≡ ,  such that d cλ λ> .  For all other variables, I define low and high 
levels. So, for instance, the amount of leverage d  could be either low, lod  or 
high, hid . Similarly for the monitoring intensities o dm m, .   
To establish complementarity (supermodularity), the cross partial of the 
function in pairs of these variables is to be shown to be positive. Therefore, in this 
model to establish complementarity, I need to show that the total certainty equivalent 
revenue function, CEQΠ  is pair-wise supermodular in ( )dd m Tλ, , ,−  by showing that 
the pair-wise cross partial of CEQΠ  in ( )dd m Tλ, , ,−  is positive. Deriving the cross-
partials of the above objective function involves a careful application of the chain rule 
to each of the terms as shown in Appendix 2.A. The simplified expressions for the 
cross-partials in Appendix 2.A show that the sign of the cross-partials depend on the 




∂ ∂  : This term captures the effect of owner and creditor monitoring on the 
variance of the signal of the managerial effort. A discussion of the sign of this term is 
crucial as it enables us to sign the effect of investor protection and creditor 
monitoring on the risk premium parameters and therefore on. CEQΠ .  As discussed 
before, monitoring in this model is intended to decrease the randomness in the 
signal Z . This assumption, referred to as the Monitoring Intensity Principle is 
standard fare in most models of incentive compensation (Milgrom and Roberts 
(1990)). By monitoring, the investors want to acquire as precise a signal as possible 







to increase managerial incentive to exert effort while reducing his share of the risk 
(the risk-incentive trade-off). This is represented as 2 0z
om
σ∂




∂ < .  Hence it 
seems reasonable to build a trade-off between owner and creditor monitoring based 
on duplication of effort. The returns from monitoring to the owner (or creditor) 
decreases with an increase in monitoring action by the creditor (owner).  
Assumption A3: Owner and creditor monitoring are substitutes in reducing third-










∂ ∂  : This term is really the effect of ownership structure and the prevailing legal 
system on the monitoring costs borne by the owner. To recap, ownership structure 
could be either concentrated or dispersed and the parameter T could be either high 
(associated with good investor protection) or low (associated with poor investor 
protection). Monitoring costs are assumed to be increasing as investor protection gets 
worse. However in these countries, an increased ownership stake reduces the effect of 
investor protection on monitoring costs since the large owner is more closely able to 





∂ ∂ > .   
Assumption A4: Increased ownership concentration makes the monitoring costs less 
sensitive to investor protection 










∂ ∂ :  This term examines the impact of increased creditor monitoring on the effect 
of investor protection on L. As investor protection decreases, L also decreases. But 







is the principle behind distressed lending and loan guarantees in the poor investor 
protection countries. Creditors like Citibank and the World Bank provide loans under 
the condition that they be given a seat on the board of directors or be involved 
actively in monitoring. This ensures that they will be to recover more if the project is 
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Assumption A5: Increased creditor monitoring makes liquidation value less sensitive 
to investor protection.  
Following assumptions A1-A5, supermodularity of the function CEQΠ  in 
( )dd m Tλ, , ,− . can be easily established as stated in the first theorem: 
 Theorem 1: High ownership concentration and high leverage are complementary 
instruments in an environment of poor shareholder protection.  
Proof: Appendix 2.A.  
Intuitively, designing of incentive contracts for management by owners 
involves a risk-incentive trade-off (Hart and Holmstrom (1987)). The source of risk is 
the imperfect measurement of managerial effort. According to “the informativeness 
principle” (Milgrom and Roberts (1990)), performance measures should be selected 
to reduce the variance in estimating managerial effort. The same can be achieved 
through costly monitoring. Monitoring by the owners enables them to shift risk away 
from the managers to themselves while leaving total firm risk (exogenous in our 
model) unchanged. Incentives to monitor are further strengthened when the owner has 
a concentrated shareholding. However, concentrated ownership comes at an 







risk, which decreases his incentives to monitor.  
To counterbalance this risk-shifting effect produced by concentrated 
ownership, the model proposes the use of leverage so that creditors can share in the 
downside risk of the firm without gaining in the upside (the third period return). This 
establishes the result in Theorem 1 that concentrated ownership and increased 
leverage are complementary instruments in an environment of weak investor 
protection.  
Theorem 2: Increased creditor monitoring is complementary to ownership 
concentration and leverage in an environment of poor shareholder protection  
Proof: Appendix 2.A.  
The theorem implies that the marginal benefit derived from increased creditor 
monitoring increases with an increase in ownership concentration and leverage. 
Therefore, we would expect to see creditors play an active monitoring role in firms 
with high ownership concentration and debt ratios and located in environments which 
are not very protective of investors. Theorems 1 and 2 both yield testable empirical 
predictions which are further discussed in Section 2.5.  
 
Corollary 1: A change in legal investor protection in a particular direction would 
cause all the complementary instruments to move in the same direction.  
Following Theorem 4 of Milgrom and Roberts (1990), the set of optimizers 
of CEQΠ , ( )dd mλ, ,  form a sublattice that rises with the parameter ( )T− . 







of investor protection becomes weaker, then it becomes desirable to increase the level 
of ownership concentration, leverage and the amount of creditor monitoring. 
Conversely, if the extent of shareholder protection were to be increased, then we 
would see dispersed ownership and low debt equity ratios.  
Further, T  could be interpreted as a parameter vector, so it could include all 
regulations pertaining to investor rights, property rights protection, stock market 
regulation, even intellectual property rights protection. So T is best thought of as a 
proxy for the laws and enforcement mechanism prevailing in the country. And 
supermodularity also implies that if it becomes desirable to increase any one element 
of the above parameter vector, then it becomes desirable to increase all elements of 
the vector. This then implies:  
 
Corollary 2: For corporate governance reforms to have full effect, all aspects of the 
organizational form should be considered.  
The complementarity approach in this paper advocates that the focus of 
corporate governance be on examining several dimensions of the agency problem 
simultaneously rather than focusing on one isolated conflict at a time. The approach 
implies that any change in the economy’s structure cannot be jump started with 
piecemeal reforms. Rather the focus should be on institution building, efficient 
corporate governance, the development and implementation of the laws necessary for 
a market economy, examination of several corporate governance instruments 
simultaneously, all of which inevitably take time. An example of the failure of 







European Commission. This was a directive undertaken to increase transparency of 
corporations in the EU but has been met with little success (ECGN 1998).  
 
Discussion: A graphical representation of supermodularity between variables can be 
shown by the single crossing property (a necessary and sufficient condition for 
monotone comparative statics). For simplicity, I restrict the variable set to ownership 
structure and leverage in the graph below. Let ownership structure be either 
concentrated or dispersed denoted by ( )con disλ λ λ∈ , ; define an ordering on ( )con disλ λ,  
so that disλ  is greater than conλ ,  dis conλ λ> .  Define high and low levels for the 
variable leverage and for the legal parameter T : ( )lo hid d d∈ ,  and ( )lo hiT T T, .  For the 
purpose of demonstrating the single crossing property, consider the simplest case of 
concentrated ownership and a poor legal system being complements. Formally this 
implies that the function CEQΠ  satisfies the single-crossing property in ownership 
structure given a legal environment if for any d ,  
[ ]( ) ( ) 0dis lo con lod T d Tλ λΠ , ; −Π , ; > ≥  (2.8) 
implies that  
( ) ( ) [ ]0dis hi con hid T d Tλ λΠ , ; −Π , ; > ≥  (2.9) 
The latter condition is satisfied if either dispersed ownership decreased the value for a 
firm operating in environments of low T or if dispersed ownership increased value for 
firms operating in both high-T and low-T15. This restriction on the direct effect of 
legal system T on ownership structure is called the single-crossing property because it 
                                                 
15 In other words, the condition is satisfied either if the precedent did not hold or if both the precedent 







requires that the difference ( )dis hid Tλ ,Π , ; - ( )con d TλΠ , ; ,  viewed as a function of T, 
crosses zero at most once and only from below.  
Referring to Panel A of Figure 2, if the magnitudes of the differences 
( ) ( )dis lo con lod T d Tλ λΠ , ; −Π , ;  and ( ) ( )dis hi con hid T d Tλ λΠ , ; −Π , ;  are given by the pairs 
of points v, w, x,y or z, then the single-crossing property is satisfied. For the points 
labeled z, the difference is negative for a firm operating in a poor legal environment 
and positive for one operating in an environment with good investor protection; hence 
concentrated ownership is appropriate for poor legal systems but dispersed ownership 
is more appropriate for good legal systems. In this case, the optimal ownership 
structure is increasing (getting more dispersed) in legal environment. For w and x, the 
differences are positive, so dispersed ownership is optimal for both types of firms and 
for v and y, both differences are negative, so concentrated ownership is optimal for 
both types of firms. The single-crossing property would not be satisfied if the 
difference were positive for poor legal systems and negative for good legal systems as 
in the pair of points labeled u in Panel B of Figure 2.  
 
2.4. Extensions 
2.4.1. Dividend Policy, Ownership Structure and Leverage  
The previous section focused on leverage and the monitoring role of debt as 
complementary instruments to concentrated ownership in corporate governance. In 
this section, I focus on the expropriation by the manager and the role of investor 







expropriated as private benefits and how much is paid out as security benefits by the 
manager.  
Agency theory has put forth several explanations for why firms pay dividends. 
According to the free cash flow theory put forth by Easterbrook (1984), Jensen 
(1986), dividends present a way of eliminating free cash flow. This leaves lesser 
funds for the insiders for their personal use. LLSV (1998) add to this literature with 
the finding that in common law countries, where investor protection is typically 
higher, firms make higher dividend payouts than firms in civil law countries. Glen, 
Karmokolias, Miller and Shah (1995) also note that dividend levels in developing 
countries are substantially lower compared with developed countries and that 
emerging market firms place more emphasis on dividend payout ratios than on the 
level of dividends Easterbrook (1984) shows that payment of dividends increases the 
frequency of external capital raising and so dividends provide a way that outside 
shareholders can have some control over the actions of insiders and thus also allows 
for increased monitoring of the investors. Another popular theory of dividends is that 
firms can signal future profitability by paying dividends (Miller and Rock 1985).  
Given the various theories on the determinants of dividend policies of firms, 
this section examines the effect of the complementarities discussed in Section 3 on 
the dividend policies of a firm. On one hand, the professional manager prefers to 
divert corporate revenues as private benefits to himself rather then pay them out as 
dividends to shareholders. And this is possible in an environment where laws allow 
stealing on the part of the manager. In this section, I show that dividend policy of the 







1998) but also depends on the company’s choice of ownership and capital structure. 
Specifically, I show that in markets of poor investor protection, concentrated 
ownership structure, high leverage and a low dividend payout policy are 
complementary variables.  
In the model presented, the manager diverts fraction δ  as private benefits 
from the first period return X .  From the second period returnY , the manager 
receives a share (1 )θ−  while the large shareholder receives a share proportional to 
his ownership stake, yλθ .  The creditors receive no part of this third period payoff. 
Therefore the dividend payments in this model are essentially yλθ .  The various 
complementary instruments have different effects on the amount of this dividend 
payment. For one, as the quality of investor protection declines, the manager is able 
to divert a greater fraction of the return as his private benefits which reduces the 
overall return in the third period. Thus we have the following proposition: 
Proposition 1: The level of dividends is declining in investor protection, ( ) 0DivT∂∂ − <   
The extent of ownership concentration has a direct and an indirect effect on 
the level of dividends paid out. The direct effect of an increase in ownership 
concentration, λ  results in an increase in the level of monitoring resources expended 
by the owner, which increases the gross expected payoff yθ .  However, as discussed 
earlier, ownership concentration also exposes the firm to greater idiosyncratic risk 
and leverage acts as a complementary instrument in diminishing this effect. However, 
with increased leverage and increased creditor monitoring, monitoring by the owner 







period return for the large shareholder, yθ .  This indirect effect coupled with the 
motivation of the manager to keep θ  low dominates the direct effect resulting in a net 
decrease in dividends. Thus we have the following theorem:  
 
Theorem 3: High ownership concentration, high leverage, low dividend payouts and 
high creditor monitoring are complementary with an unregulated stock market.  
Proof: Once each of the variables are constrained as in Theorem 1 and 2, this theorem 
follows as a direct consequence of the two theorems and proposition 1. The 
supermodularity of (λ, d, md) has already been established in the proofs of Theorem 1 
and 2. Mathematically the above theorem is equivalent to stating that the dividend 
payments to the shareholders, ( )dDiv T d mλ− , , ,  is pair-wise submodular in 
( )dT d mλ− , , ,   
This finding subscribes to the outcome model of dividends proposed by LLSV 
(1998) which says that low dividends are an outcome of poor legal protection of 
minority shareholders. This paper qualifies the theory saying that both concentrated 
ownership and a low value of parameter T, which is our proxy for the legal system 
contribute to the firm establishing a low dividend policy.  
 
2.4.2. Contracting  
Given the complementarities established in the previous sections between a 
firm’s selection of its ownership structure, capital structure and dividend policy, what 







the same method of discovering strategic complements in a firm’s corporate finance 
policies explain why the Asian business landscape is dotted with business groups and 
network structures like the chaebol, keiretsu and quanxi16 unlike the more molecular 
organizations found in the west?  
Economics and management literature has grappled with issues about 
organization and contracting for a long time now. A dominant paradigm used to 
explain make-or-buy decisions is based on efficiency considerations of Transaction 
Cost literature (Williamson 1985) which assumes that specialized assets have lower 
transaction costs within the firm. On the basis of this assumption, when high asset 
specificity is involved or when there is high degree of uncertainty, a hierarchical 
mode of governance (vertical integration) is preferred over external sourcing 
(markets) to avoid supplier’s opportunism.  
The “hold-problem” is central to the definition of firm boundaries in the 
transaction-cost literature. This problem is introduced through a cost function in the 
original model set-up. Assume that the entrepreneur in the model possesses a unique 
critical resource, which can be combined with an intermediate product from another 
firm (intermediate agent) to produce the second stage output Y. The firm is 
vulnerable to hold-up by the other party. Two ways of overcoming the hold-up 
problem is either through a formal mechanism (formal contracts or merger) or 
through relational contracting.  
Let tc  be the cost of transacting in the market or in other words the cost of the 
hold-up problem. This cost is a function of the legal rules prevailing in the country 
                                                 







(parameterT ), the ownership stakeλ . It is also affected, in albeit different ways, by 
the extent of network formation, ν  (relational contracting)17. These costs include 
those of drafting, negotiating and safeguarding the terms of a sale or purchase, 
payment and settlement, and the costs incurred to enforce contracts or to correct and 
resolve contract disagreements.  
Assumption A6: The marginal cost of formal contracting mechanisms increases in a 






∂ − ∂ ≥ . 
The above assumption asserts that the cost of drawing up a formal contract 
increases when the institutional environment doesn’t have proper formal authority or 
enforcement to back the contract. It formalizes the idea that if the intermediate party 
were to renege on the contract, there would be no legal recourse for the entrepreneur 
to get the terms of his contract enforced. So a poor legal system reduces the marginal 
value of the formal contracting process.  
Proposition 2: The marginal cost of transaction decreases with an increase in the 
extent of network formation, v, and in ownership concentration, λ, in an environment 
of poor legal protection and enforcement. 
Mathematically, this states that ( )tc Tλ ν, ,−  is submodular in ( )Tλ ν, ,−
18.In 
other words, the cost of doing business via a relational contract decreases in an 
environment of poor legal system when the extent of network formation is large and 
when the firm belongs to a concentrated ownership structure. These trends are 
                                                 
17 For the purposes of this study, I abstract away from asset specificity, technological uncertainty and 
frequency of transaction, the main determinants of transaction costs according to Williamson (1975). 
But it can be shown that inclusion of any of these variables doesn’t alter the results, and in fact adds in 
to the complementarity effect. Even with uncertainty, one would not expect different results because 
expectation of a supermodular function is supermodular. 
18 If a function –f(x) is supermodular, then f(x) is said to be submodular. A (strictly) submodular 











T x x ν λ
∂
∂ − ∂ ≤ , = ,  The proposition is easy to prove when 
we consider the different interactions between the determinants of transaction cost 
parameter. As the legal environment decreases or with an increase in ownership 
concentration, a first order effect would be an increase in transaction costs. A family-
owned concentrated ownership enterprise would be looked upon with suspicion as a 
vehicle of expropriation and the cost of doing business would be large. But this cost 
decreases when the firm is part of a business group or network which doesn’t rely on 
formal mechanisms but more on informal relationships and intangibles like trust and 
reputation. And this effect is further enhanced when the firm is a family controlled 
enterprise, which on the basis of its reputation and family controls is allowed to be a 
part of the network. Another interpretation for the ν  parameter would be to view it as 
a measure of market thickness (McLaren (2000)) in terms of the number of firms 
depending on relational contracting. The above proposition would then imply that 
greater the market thickness or greater the number of unintegrated firms, greater is the 
opportunity for cost reduction through relational contracting.  
Several recent empirical studies on business groups corroborate the above 
proposition but all speak of different influencing factors for the dominance of 
relational contracting in areas of poor legal systems. Khanna and Palepu (2000a) in a 
study of Indian firms find that social links among member firms reduces transaction 
costs due to better information dissemination19. McMillan and Woodruff (1999a, b) 
find that relational contracting within a business network is of considerable 
                                                 
19 If a function –f(x) is supermodular, then f(x) is said to be submodular. A (strictly) submodular 







importance in allowing contracts without adequate institutions in Vietnam. Similar 
results are obtained by Johnson, McMillan and Woodruff (2000) in Russia.  
An interesting exercise at this point would be to see how belonging to a group 
structure influences the dividend policies of the firm. Would it continue to be low 
because the firm would want to expropriate in other ways rather than paying out a 
dividend or would the responsibility arising out of belonging to a network determine 
the dividend policy. A testable hypothesis would be that more than shareholder-
minority investor relations, the cash needs of the group would dictate dividend policy. 
The reason being that when the firm is part of a conglomerate structure, the dividend 
policy of each subsidiary, which may be publicly listed, is often determined by the 
central holding company.  
 
2.5. Empirical Results 
This section tests the hypothesis presented in Section 2.3 that a firm’s 
decisions about ownership structure and leverage are complementary with one 
another. In this section, I describe the data set and present some simple tests based on 
unconditional and conditional correlations to establish complementarity. This 
approach based on revealed preference has been analyzed theoretically in Holmstrom 
and Milgrom (1994), Arora and Gambardella (1990) and Arora (1996). See Athey 
and Stern (1996) for an excellent discussion of the various approaches used to test 








2.5.1 The Data  
The econometric analysis uses data on individual firms taken from the 
Amadeus Database (Analyze Major Database from European Sources) by Bureau 
Van Dijk Amadeus provides balance sheet information on European firms having 
minimal size requirements (sales greater than ten million Euros or total assets greater 
than ten million Euros) over the 1990s. It also identifies the major shareholders of 
these firms and their direct and indirect stakes in the firm.  
For the purpose of this study, I obtain information on 140195 manufacturing 
firms in 13 Transition economies over the period 1990 to 1999. For each firm, I 
obtain two measures of ownership concentration suggested by Demsetz and Lehn 
(1985) and used in several other studies–the ownership stake of the five largest 
shareholders ( 5o ) and the Herfindahl index of ownership concentration ( HI ). We 
also construct a measure of firm leverage, lev , defined as total debt to total assets of 
the firm.  
Although the data allows testing of the model with a large number of firms, 
there are some limitations. There is no information on the monitoring activities of the 
creditors and the owners and hence we are restricted to testing complementarity for a 
subset of the decision variables-ownership and leverage. However, an important 
empirical implication of the lattice theoretical approach used in this paper is that 
optimizing only on a subset of decision variables does not alter the complementarity 
relations among the rest of the decision variables of the theoretical model. This result 
justifies that we study only a subset of the complementary strategies of the firms.  







I obtain data on the shareholder and creditor rights in the country from La Porta, 
Lopez-de-Silanes, Shleifer and Vishny (1997) and Pistor et. al (2000). I also obtain 
data on property rights regulation from the Heritage Foundation and a measure of 
institutional environment in which firms operate from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi 
(2003). The variables are described in detail in Table 2.2. 
 
2.5.2. Unconditional Correlations  
A direct test of the theory developed in Section 2.3 would be to test 
supermodularity of the value function Π  in (1), which is difficult to estimate. Since 
one cannot observe the firm’s objective function, one is constrained to testing the 
implications of the theory. In particular, the theoretical model of Section 2.3 implies 
that if the endogenous variables are complements, then one would expect them to be 
positively correlated. In Table 1, I test the null hypothesis that a pair of variables is 
uncorrelated with a standard Pearson correlation coefficient. In addition, one of the 
main properties of supermodular functions is that the results are unchanged by 
monotone transformations of the variables. This suggests that rank based tests such as 
the Spearman’s rank correlation coefficient and the Kendall rank correlation would 
also be appropriate measures.  
Table 3 presents all three measures of the correlation coefficient. Both the 
measures of ownership concentration are positively correlated with leverage with a 
high degree of significance on the basis of all three measures. Therefore, the data 
suggests that firms with concentrated ownership structures in Transition economies 







However, positive correlations are only a necessary but not sufficient 
condition for complementarity. Arora (1996) shows that positive correlations could 
arise due to omitted variable bias or due to indirect effects through other strategies. A 
stronger test of complementarity would require controlling for firm-specific factors 
that may affect these governance instruments. After controlling for these specific 
effects that may reflect forces outside this model, the complementary forces 
underlying the model should be the dominant ones and one would expect the residual 
of the regressions to be complementary, at least weakly. Arora and Gambardella 
(1990) introduce a formal analysis of conditional correlations as a test for 
complementarity. Further, this approach has been the predominant approach followed 
by recent empirical papers about complementarity, including Brickley (1999), 
Barclay, Marx and Smith (2003) and Arrunada, Garciano, and Vasquez (1999). The 
following section describes the results from the residual based correlations.  
 
2.5.3. Conditional Correlations   
In this subsection, I test the hypothesis that the covariance between ownership 
and leverage, conditional upon a set of firm characteristics, is non-negative. In other 
words, complementarity between ownership and leverage also implies that 
conditional correlation coefficients are positive (Arora 1996).  
Conditional correlation coefficients are calculated based on the residuals from 
reduced form regressions of ownership and leverage on all observable exogenous 
variables, estimated equation by equation. Measuring the correlation of the residuals 







characteristics. The decision variables used are percentage holding of the five largest 
shareholders, ( 5o ) as a measure of ownership concentration and the leverage ratio, 
( lev ) of the firm. I also experimented with Herfindahl index as a measure of 
ownership concentration and obtained similar results. Only the results with 15o  are 
reported in Table 3.  
As part of the conditioning set, I include the usual suspects that have been 
established in the corporate finance literature as the basic determinants of debt and 
ownership structure. In addition to industry dummies at the 2-digit SIC code level (sic 
codes 20-39), I include several firm-specific variables. Firm size is represented 
by SIZE , which is measured by the log of the total sales of the firm. Firm size has 
been found to be an important determinant for both ownership (Demsetz and Lehn 
1985) and leverage (Titman and Wessels 1988). In addition to firm size, following 
Friedman, Johnson and Mitton (2003), I also include firm growth,GROWTH , which 
is calculated as the growth in firm sales and firm profitability, ROA , which is 
calculated as the return on assets. I also include firm age, AGE , which is the number 
of years since the date of incorporation of the firm.  
Recent empirical literature has also established country specific law and 
institutional factors to be important determinants of ownership and leverage ratios. I 
use four country-level variables: SHRIGHTS  is the level of shareholder rights 
protection in the country and CRRIGHTS  is the extent of creditor rights protection in 
the country and both are taken from LLSV (1998) and Pistor et al. (2000). The 







49 countries which did not include the Transition economies. Pistor et. al (2000) 
builds on and extends the work of LLSV (1998) to develop the investor rights indices 
for the Transition countries. PROPERTY  is a measure of property rights from The 
Heritage Foundation which indicates the degree to which property rights are protected 
in the economy. KK  is a summary variable of the institutional environment in which 
firms operate from Kaufman, Kraay and Mastruzzi (2003) that averages six indicators 
proxying for voice and accountability, regulatory quality, political stability, rule of 
law, control of corruption and effectiveness of government. An ideal country-specific 
variable that could be used would be a measure of accounting standards described in 
LLSV (1998) but this variable is not available for the Transition economies. 
However, studies have shown a high degree of correlation between the legal variables 
described above and the extent of accounting standards in the country.  
As a first step, I regress the two decision variables, 5o  and lev  on the above 
control variables. So the regression equations to be estimated are:  
 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
5o SIZE GROWTH ROA AGE SHRIGHTS
PROPERTY KK INDUSTRY DUMMIES
α β β β β β
β β β




 1 2 3 4 5
6 7 8
lev SIZE GROWTH ROA AGE CRRIGHTS
PROPERTY KK INDUSTRY DUMMIES
α β β β β β
β β β
= + + + + + +
+ +
(2.11) 
As a second step, I perform a correlation analysis of the residuals from the 
regressions above. Panel A of Table 3 presents the OLS regression results and Panel 
B presents the correlation analysis of the residuals. Panel A shows that firm size is 







lower leverage ratios and lower ownership concentration.  
Panel B shows that the Pearson correlation coefficient is 0.0265 and the 
Spearman correlation coefficient is 0.3905, both of which are significant at the 1 
percent level. This shows that ownership and leverage ratios are pair-wise 
complementary in environments of poor regulation such as the Transition economies.  
However, it should be noted that the results in this section need to be 
substantiated with a more rigorous empirical study. The residuals based correlations 
in this section capture the effect of the existence of complementarity conditional only 
on the observed firms’ characteristics. But Athey and Stern (1996) show that this 
approach is still subject to bias due to unobserved heterogeneity. Developing a 
stronger test of the complementary relations discussed in this paper is the subject of  
future research.  
 
2.6. Conclusion 
In this paper, a theory has been proposed that in an environment of poor 
investor protection, a firm’s selection of ownership and capital structure should be 
part of a joint decision making process since they are complementary instruments. 
Adoption of any one instrument influences the adoption of the other. While 
concentrated ownership helps solves the problem of managerial moral hazard, it 
comes with the opportunity cost of exposing the large shareholder to greater 
idiosyncratic risk. Leverage offsets this risk by allowing the shareholder to share the 







in environments of poor investor protection have concentrated ownership structures 
and high leverage ratios.  
The theory is borne out by correlation tests done on a sample of firms from 
the Amadeus database. Using the residual based correlations approach described in 
Arora and Gambardella (1990), the paper finds that ownership concentration and 
leverage are pair-wise complementary in the Transition economies. The results 
contribute to existing empirical literature in law and finance by LLSV who document 
the effect of investor protection on ownership (LLSV 2000) and external financing 
(LLSV 1997) independently. This paper considers the interactions between these 
decisions to show that decisions of ownership and leverage are not merely correlated 
but the marginal benefits of using one increase with the use of the other.  
In addition, the model generates several testable empirical predictions. The 
paper predicts that the complementary cluster of concentrated ownership and high 
leverage in poor investor protection environments is also associated with increased 
creditor monitoring and low dividend payouts. The result on increased monitoring is 
consistent with lending practices in these countries where provision of loan 
guarantees is often accompanied by seats on supervisory boards of the banks’ 
corporate clients. The paper also predicts that firms adopting this complementary 
depend on business groups and relational network structures for contracting rather 
than on formal contracting mechanisms.  
An important advantage of using lattice theory to obtain comparative static 
results is that it allows us to model several agency problems simultaneously and still 







be a vector that encompasses different aspects of investor protection. Representing T  
as a parameter vector would allow us to identify and isolate which aspects of 
shareholder rights or creditor rights protection are most important to tackle agency 
problems.  
The results in the paper also have implications for corporate governance 
reform. The complementarity approach advocates that the focus of corporate 
governance should be synergistic: that is recognition that the interaction of two or 
more governance instruments to produce a combined effect is greater than the sum of 
their separate effects. Regulators therefore need to consider all dimensions of the 
corporate form before making changes to any one aspect.  
The results also suggest that focusing on complementarities is important for 
financial system design. This is of particular significance in transition economies 
where the financial system is in its infancy and the focus is on designing stable 
financial system architecture. The idea that organizational forms survive because they 
are supported by complementary elements is not new in the economics literature. 
Williamson (1991) argues that viable organizational forms require a “syndrome of 
attributes that bear a supporting relation to one another” and contends that many 
forms of organization “never arise, or quickly die out, because they combine 
inconsistent features.” This paper reinforces the same idea but uses a different set of 
instruments- ownership, dividend policy, financing and contracting regime  
These results in this paper suggest several important directions for additional 
research. One, the model doesn’t consider the role of markets in providing 







explicitly for the role of financial markets would presumably yield interesting 
conclusions on cost of capital and market interest rates.  
Second, the investor protection parameter in the model proxies for an 
aggregate measure of the various rights given to shareholders in different legal 
systems. A valuable extension to the model would involve modeling this parameter as 
a vector to study the effect of each of the individual rights in greater detail. The 
vector components could also be extended to include creditor rights and even 
intellectual property rights protection. Application of lattice theory and comparative 
statics would then help identify which aspects of the legal system behave as 
complements and which behave as substitutes. Such a model would help greatly in 
correctly identifying the relevant legal system variables to be used on the right hand 
side in regression analysis.  
Third, though the model deals with managerial moral hazard, it does not use 
management compensation as a corporate governance instrument, which when 
included could provide valuable insights. Corporate finance literature on executive 
compensation has established the link between pecuniary incentives for management 
and use of leverage (John and John 1993). Extending the model in this paper would 
allow us to comment on how the joint adoption of concentrated ownership and high 
leverage affects management compensation. Finally, as discussed in Section 2.4, 
additional research would involve looking at stronger empirical tests of 
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of large SH getting 
caught and the fine he 
pays 
 
Stealing is associated with 
a punishment technology 
that imposes a cost which 
is dependent on legal 
protection 
 
The legal system and the 
level of market 
development affect the 
level of private benefits, 
the ease of takeovers and 
the efficiency of bank 
monitoring. 
 
Legal rules affect 
entrepreneur’s 
incentives to monitor 
and the resource 
allocation decision 
chosen by manager 
 
Legal investor protection 
affects monitoring and the level 















No consideration of 
dividends, contracting 
 




No consideration of cost of 
capital, takeovers 
* The table compares models which are closest in motivation and intent to this paper. Any omission of other models of investor protection and corporate 











Variable Definition       Source 
  
Firm-level Variables  
   
o15 Percentage holding of five largest shareholders      Amadeus 
HI Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration. Calculated as 
the sum of squared ownership stakes of all the shareholders
     Amadeus 
SIZE Log of total firm sales      Amadeus 
AGE Numbers of years since the date of incorporation      Amadeus 
GROWTH Growth in firm sales      Amadeus 
ROA Return on assets      Amadeus 
   
Country-level Variables  
   
Property Rights The degree to which property rights are protected in an 
economy 
     Heritage Foundation
KK Average of  following six institutional variables: voice 
accountability, political stability, government effectiveness, 
regulatory quality, rule of law and control of corruption 
     Kaufman, Kraay 
and  
      Mastruzzi (2003) 
SHrights Anti-director rights index formed by aggregating 
shareholder rights. The index is formed by adding 1 when 
(1) the country allows shareholders to mail their proxy vote; 
(2) shareholders are not required to deposit their shares 
prior to the General Shareholders’ Meeting; (3) cumulative 
voting in board of directors is allowed; (4) an oppressed 
minorities mechanism is in place; (5) the minimum 
percentage of share capital that entitles a shareholder to call 
for an Extraordinary Shareholders’ Meeting is less than or 
equal to 10 percent; or (6) shareholders have preemptive 
rights that can only be waived by a shareholders’ vote. 
Index ranges from 0 to 6. 
     La Porta et.al (1998)
     Pistor et.al (2000) 
CRrights An index aggregating different creditor rights. The index is 
formed by adding 1 when (1) the country imposes 
restrictions to file for reorganization; (2) there is no 
automatic stay (3) secured creditors are ranked first in the 
distribution of proceeds that results from disposition of 
assets of a bankrupt firm; and (4) the debtor does not retain 
administration of its property pending the resolution of the 
reorganization. The index ranges from 0 to 4. 
     La Porta et.al (1998)
     Pistor et. al (2000) 
   
Industry Dummies   
   
sic20-sic39 Manufacturing Industries  











Panel A presents Pearsons correlations between ownership concentration and leverage ratios. Panel B presents the 
Spearman correlation coefficients between ownership concentration and leverage ratios. The null hypothesis of the 
Spearman correlation coefficient is that the two variables are independent. Two measures of ownership 
concentration are used: o15 is the percentage stake of the five largest shareholders and Herfindahl Index is the 
Herfindahl Index of ownership concentration calculated as the sum of the squared ownership stakes of all the 
shareholders of the firm. Leverage Ratio is measured as the ratio of total debt to total assets. Values are 1990-1999 
averages. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
  
Panel A: Pearsons Correlation 
 O15 Herfindahl Index Leverage Ratio 
O15 1   
Herfindahl Index 0.6333***  1  
Leverage Ratio 0.0589** 0.0067* 1 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
 
Panel B: Spearman Correlation 
 
























 O15 Herfindahl Index Leverage Ratio 
O15 1   
Herfindahl Index 0.5840*** 1  










Complementarity of Ownership and Leverage Ratios 
 
Panel A presents the OLS regressions. The regression equation estimated in specification (1) is : Ownership=α +  
β1 Size + β2 Age +β3 Growth+ β4ROA + β5Property + β6KK + β7SHrights + β8 Industry Dummies. The dependent 
variable, Ownership is the percentage holding of the five largest shareholders in the company. Size is the log of 
total sales of the firm. Age is the number of years since the date of incorporation. Growth is the growth in firm 
sales. ROA is return on assets. Property is a property rights index from the Heritage Foundation. KK is an 
aggregate indicator of institutional quality from Kaufman, Kraay and Maastruzzi (2003). SHrights is a measure of 
shareholder rights protection from Pistor et. al (2000). Industry dummies are 19 industry dummies controlling for 
2-digit sic codes 20-39. The regression equation estimated in specification (2) is similar to (1) : Leverage Ratio=α 
+  β1 Size + β2 Age +β3 Growth+ β4ROA + β5Property + β6KK + β7CRrights + β8 Industry Dummies. The 
dependent variable Leverage Ratio is the ratio of total debt to total assets of the firm. The regressor variables are 
the same as in specification (1) except for CRrights which is the creditor rights index from Pistor et al. (2000). 
Values are 1990-1999 averages. Detailed variable definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
Panel B presents the correlations between the residuals from regressions (1) and (2). The first number in each cell 
is the Pearson’s correlation coefficient and the second number is the Spearman correlation coefficient. The null 
hypothesis of the Spearman correlation coefficient is that the two variables are independent. Detailed variable 
definitions and sources are in the appendix. 
 
Panel A: OLS Regressions 
  Ownership Leverage Ratio 
Constant 150.390*** 2.249 
 (0.742) (2.586) 
Size -0.599*** -0.088*** 
 (0.011) (0.014) 
Age -0.008*** 0.000 
 (0.001) (0.002) 
Growth 0.000* 0.000 
 0.000  0.000  
ROA 0.000 -0.003*** 
 0.000  0.000  
SHrights -2.967***  
 (0.446)  
Crrights  0.028 
  -0.340 
Property Rights -16.960*** 0.193 
 (0.559) (0.630) 
KK 25.803*** -0.290 
 (1.281) (1.235) 
N 120848 120848 
R-square 0.18 0.17 
*, ** and *** represent significance at the 1, 5 and 10% level respectively 
 
 
Panel B: Conditional Correlations 
 Pearsons Spearman 
Ownership-Leverage Ratio 0.0265*** 0.3905*** 












• Owner chooses 
ownership stake, λ 
•  Debt with face 
value D issued. 
• Monitoring 
resources, mc and 
m0 chosen by 
owner and creditor 
 
t=1  
• Project’s cash flows are realized. 
 




debt payments D 
and dividends div 
 
0 
If project return is 
0, firm is 
liquidated for 
L(e1, mc, T) 
t=2 
• Project returns 
Y 
• Z is signal of Y 
• Owner get Y-
θZ 
• Manager gets 
θZ 










Figure 2: Graphical Representation of Supermodularity 
     Panel A illustrates cases that are consistent with single crossing property    .  
Panel B illustrates a relation that is ruled out.    
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Appendix 2.A. The Complementarity Results 
Proofs of Theorem 1 and 2: The Total expected certainty equivalent is given by:  
1 2 2 1[ ( ) ] (1 ) ( )CEQ d o o d d o dX y e e e L e m c m c m R I Iα α ,Π = + , − + − − − − − −                 (A1) 
Theorem 1 states the supermodularity of ownership concentration and leverage with a 
weak investor protection environment and Theorem 2 expands the complementary 
cluster to include the share of monitoring borne by the creditor. To prove that CEQΠ  is 
a supermodular function in ( dT mλ− , ,  and )d  , we follow Milgrom and 
Roberts(1992) and Holmstrom and Milgrom(1990)  
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= + + ∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ 
                                                                      (A2) 
Sign of this second order derivative depends crucially on the sign of the last term 
because the first two terms can be shown to be positive easily. Since creditor and 















∂ ∂ >  
involves a careful application of the Chain Rule for partial derivatives. The risk 
premium R  is a non-linear increasing function of the coefficient of risk aversion, r , 
the share of the manager in the stochastic third period output 1 θ− ,  the variance of his 
payoff 2yσ ,  and the manager’s share in the liquidation value, d . The monitoring 







2 (y omσ , )dm .  But ( )d om m ,  the extent of creditor monitoring is dependent on the 
amount of owner monitoring undertaken and om  itself is a function of the parameter 
vector T . Therefore,we have  
















d y d d y
R R R
T m T m m T
σ σ
σ σ
  ∂ ∂∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂
= +   
∂ − ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂ ∂      
                                                                   (A4) 
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Analyzing each term in the above equation, the risk premium increases with 
















 is negative since owner and creditor monitoring are substitutes while 
the second term is positive since we are looking at their cross partial in determining 





 being less than zero. 
Hence the combination of terms within the outer brackets is taken to be positive 






















∂  or the impact of the stock market 
regulation parameter on the monitoring resources spent by the owner. For better legal 
protection to have an increasing effect on the extent of monitoring undertaken by the 
owner, we are looking at a dispersed ownership structure. If the ownership structure 
was concentrated, then the legal system might actually constrain any active role that 
the large blockholder might want to have. Hence, increased creditor monitoring and a 
poor legal system would be complementary at concentrated ownership structures.  
 








                                                                                                   (A8) 
This has already been discussed in Proposition 2 which shows that a poor investor 
protection environment and a concentrated ownership structure go together much like 
in the Civil Law Countries. Conversely, a dispersed ownership structure and a good 
legal system are complementary as in the countries that have adopted English 
Common Law.  
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Therefore countries with poor legal shareholder protection have high debt ratios.  














The intuition for this result comes from the fact that creditor monitoring and leverage 
are both complementary in generating a high liquidation value for the creditor which 
would make the whole cross partial of CEQΠ  with respect to dm  and d greater than 
zero.  
Effect of creditor monitoring and ownership:  
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We have already shown the term in the inner brackets to be 0  when we 
discussed the effect of creditor monitoring on the risk premium. So the sign of the 
entire derivative depends crucially on the impact of concentrated ownership on 
monitoring resources spent by the owner. There is an increasing relation between 
concentrated ownership and monitoring resources only when the legal environment is 
weak and not protective of shareholder rights and not imposing any controls on the 
activity of the large shareholder. Conversely, 0omλ
∂
∂ <  when the stock market 







restrictions on active monitoring role by the blockholder. Thus, creditor monitoring 
and concentrated ownership are complementary in environments of poor investor 
protection.  
Application of the above 5 results prove Theorem 1 and 2: The total certainty 







Appendix 2.B. Basics of Lattice Theory and Supermodular Functions 
This section includes concepts and results on supermodularity and 
complementarity that are relevant for the model of the firm discussed in this paper. 
For a collection of optimization problems where the objective function and the 
constraint set depend on a parameter(in our model, the parameter T), monotone 
comparative statics (which is the primary issue considered herein) examines scenarios 
where optimal decisions or equilibria vary monotonically with the parameter. To 
develop a general theory of monotone comparative statics, what we need is lattice 
theory. We first introduce our notation and some definitions.  
A binary relation °  on a set X  specifies for all x′  and x′′  in X  either that x x′ ′′°  
is true or that x x′ ′′≤  is false. A partially ordered set is a set X  on which there is a 
binary relation °  that is reflexive, antisymmetric, and transitive. For x′ and x′′  
elements of the partially ordered set X , let x x′′∨ , denote the least upper bound, or 
join, of x′  and x′′  and let x ∧  x′′  denote the greatest lower bound, or meet of x′ and 
x′′  in X .  
Definition 1. The set X is a lattice if for every pair of elements of x’ and x” in X, the 
join x x′′∨  and the meet x ∧  x′′do exist as elements of X. Similarly a subset S of X is 
a sublattice of X if S is closed under the operations meet and join. Therefore, a 
sublattice is a partially ordered set which is closed under the maximum and minimum 
operations on its elements.  
The definition of a sublattice represents the idea that if it is possible to engage 







equally high levels of all of the activities simultaneously. It also allows for the 
possibility that some activities are at a high level only if other activities are at a high 
level as well. Next, the notion of increasing differences is a well known condition for 
a utility function to be that of a system of complementary products.  
Definition 2. A collection of products (or activities or other decision variables or 
parameters) are complements and each pair is said to be complementary if the 
products have a real valued utility function with increasing differences. Therefore, a 
set of activities are complements if the additional utility resulting from the availability 
of any additional activity is increasing with the set of other activities available.  
Milgrom and Roberts (1990) shows that complementarities among variables 
in a problem with a lattice structure are sufficient for strong comparative static 
results. Milgrom and Shannon (1994) show that for a firm’s optimal policy 
characteristics to depend monotonically on firm characteristics (i.e. for 
complementarities), a necessary and sufficient condition is one of supermodularity. 
So supermodular functions on a lattice provide a mathematical context for studying 
complementarity and monotone comparative statics.  
Definition 3. A function that exhibits complementarities among its arguments is a 
supermodular function. Suppose that f(x) is a real valued function on a lattice X. Then 
f(x) is supermodular if ( ) ( ) (min( )) (max( ))f x f x f x x f x x′ ′′ ′ ′′ ′ ′′+ ≤ , + ,   
This is clearly equivalent to  
 
( ) (min( )) ( ) (min( ))
(max( )) (min( ))
f x f x x f x f x x
f x x f x x
′ ′ ′′ ′′ ′ ′′
′ ′′ ′ ′′
   − , + − , ≤   
, − ,







This implies that sum of changes in the function when several arguments are 
increasing separately is less than changes resulting from increasing all arguments 
together. Or increasing one/more variables increases the return to other variables. 
Although the concept of supermodularity may seem abstract and difficult to check, 
the following theorems of Topkis (1978) allow easy characterization of 
supermodularity for smooth functions.  
Theorem B1: Let n mf R R R: × →  be twice continuously differentiable on the 
interval ( )a b, . Then f  has increasing differences in ( )x t,  if and only if 
2 0i jf x t∂ ∂ ∂ ≥  for 1 1i n j m= ,..., , = ,,, ; and f  is supermodular in x  if and only if 
2 0i jf x x∂ ∂ ∂ ≥  for i j≠   
The above theorem basically says that supermodularity implies increasing 
differences for a function on a sublattice of the direct product of lattices. The 
converse is also true that is, on the direct product of finitely many lattices, increasing 
differences together with supermodularity in each component implies 
supermodularity. In general, supermodularity, like all concepts in this theory, uses 
only the order structure of the lattice. It entails no assumptions of convexity or 
concavity or connectedness of the domain. However, in view of the above theorem, it 
is particularly easy to check whether smooth functions on Euclidean intervals are 
supermodular. Furthermore, as the next theorem illustrates, supermodularity is 
preserved under a number of operations  
Theorem B2:Suppose that X is a lattice.  







(b) If f(x) and g(x) are supermodular on X, then f(x)+g(x) is supermodular on X  
(c) If f ( )k x is sup er mod ular on X for k=1,2,... and lim k→∞  f ( ) ( )k x f x=  for each x in 
X, then f(x) is supermodular on X  
So in establishing our supermodularity results, following Theorems B1 and 
B2, all we need to ensure is that the cross-partials are positive. This is done in 
Appendix A. For the constrained optimization of our certainty equivalent function, 
the following two theorems from Milgrom and Roberts (1990) are the most relevant.  
Theorem B3: Suppose n kf R R+: →  is supermodular and suppose ( )T y  and ( )T y′  
are sublattices of nR .Let ( ) argmax{ ( ) ( )}S y f z y z T y≡ , | ∈ , and define ( )S y′  
analogously. Then y y′≥  and ( ) ( )T y T y′≥  imply that ( ) ( )S y S y′≥   
Theorem B4: Suppose n kf R R+: →  is supermodular and suppose T  is a sublattice 
of nR . Then the set of maximizers of f  over T  is also a sublattice.  
Theorem B3 basically says that the set of optimizers “rises” as the parameter 
values increases. In other words, the theorem implies that supermodularity is 
preserved under the maximization operation. An implication of this is that if one 
optimizes a system of complementary products with respect to any subset of the 
products then the remaining products would still be complementary. Theorem B4 
shows that the set of points at which a supermodular function attains its maximum on 
a lattice is a sublattice. These theorems are directly employed in proving that 
ownership concentration, leverage, creditor monitoring, dividend payouts and 
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